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Statement of the Research Question
and Subsidiary Question
The First Hoover Commission in 1949 recommended use of the accrual
method of accounting in maintaining Government accounts. The Hoover Report
highlighted a major deficiency that some managers had begun to realize during
the war and in the immediate years following. The traditional "cash" basis
of accounting simply did not provide sufficient or reliable data to aid manage-
ment.
The 1950 Budget and Accounting Act, implementing the Hoover Commissions
accounting recommendations, failed to specifically mention or require accrual
accounting. Many experts; however, have interpreted the legislative language
requiring "effective control of receipts, funds, expenditures, and other
assets" as a mandate for accrual systems. Any doubt was cleared up by the
1956 Amendments to the 1950 Act. Accrual Accounting became a statutory re-
quirement for all Federal agencies.
Between 1964-1968, the House Committee on Government Operations held
four hearings and issued two reports on the progress being made by agencies in
implementing accrual systems. The hearings revealed considerable foot dragging
in complying with the earlier legislation. The interest shown by Congress
stirred action on tiie part of some of the agencies.
Additional impetus was provided in 19o7 by the President's Commission
1

on Budget Concept recommendation that the Federal Budget be unified and stated
on an "accrued expenditure" basis by Fiscal Year 1971. A prerequisite to con-
verting the budget was the establishment of supporting accrual accounting
systems* President Johnson personally endorsed the Commissions recommendation
and the development of accrual systems. Subsequently, President Nixon pub-
lished a personal memorandum urging due haste in conversion of accounting
systems.
The facts show tiiat in spite of the legislation, the recommendations of
high level commissions , the urging of a powerful House committee, and the per-
sonal interest of two President's that accrual accounting systems have as yet
not been satisfactorily developed in all Federal agencies. Largely for this
reason, the accrued expenditure budget has been deferred, first until Fiscal
Year 1972 and currently to 1975.
Although the General Accounting Office no longer keeps statistics on the
formal approval of systems in operations, data on approvals of accounting
principles and systems design and published reports and articles make it obvious
that many agencies have encountered serious obstacles (e.g. , accruals of con-
structive deliveries and Federal grants) in making the necessary system changes.
There is also evidence that accrual accounting is still being resisted by both
internal and external sources. Recently, the Defense Blue Ribbon Panel recom-
mended against accrual accounting, excepting working capital funds. Other
attacks have been leveled by the House Appropriations Committee.
Fifteen years after making accrual accounting a statutory requirement
and long after adopting the practice as a standard of business accounting, the
question and research topic of this paper is:
Why has uniform adoption of modern accrual accounting systems in the
Federal Government been delayed?

In order to answer this central question, it will be necessary to re-
search and answer the following subsidiary questions.
1. What are the applicability and potential benefits of accrual
accounting to the Federal Government?
2. What has been the history and development of accounting concepts
used in Government?
3. What has been the role of the executive Branch in developing the
accrual concept?
4. What has been the Congressional position in the evolution of
accrual systems?
Purpose of the Study
There are several purposes to be accomplished by this study. The
organization for Federal accounting that has evolved through the years will be
examined. A major contention that will be developed is that the structure for
accomplishing accounting changes and improvements is wrong as the result of
Congress having been more interested in politcal questions of maintaining
power and jurisdiction than in the solution of rudimentary issues.
The paper will also show that elements within Congress have often acted
contrary to encouraging the development of accrual systems and that well meant
efforts have often had opposite effects from those intended. The emphasis of
the Appropriations Committee on obligations in the budget process will be cited
as a major deterrent to development of accrual accounting. The interest of the
House Committee on Government Operations in better accounting will be seen as
sometimes generating premature arid partial efforts on the part of the agencies.
The General Accounting Office will be shown to have caused considerable
delay in improvements as the result of the vague wording of principles, failure

4to initially obtain understanding and cooperation of agencies, and an overly
complicated systems approval procedure.
It will also be demonstrated that some agencies have strongly resisted
or been indifferent to change and that in other instances a combination of
problems have precluded the full application of accrual concepts. In the later
respect, the paper will show that all parties involved have consistently under-
estimated the deptii of the problems and the time required to solve them, thus
resulting in frustration a7id harassment.
Finally, the paper will show that accrual accounting has a definite value
in government operations, not only in those few areas in government where reve-
nues are earned (e.g., working capital funds), but in all areas where an
accurate and consistent measure of costs cannot be determined through cash
accounting.
Scope of the Study
The purpose of the study will be served by reviewing and analyzing the
events providing impetus or effecting the move to accrual accounting. Since
accounting and budgeting are closely interrelated, it will be necessary to
examine budgetary developments impacting in the area of accrual accounting.
For the same reason, it will be necessary to outline efforts such as the Joint
Financial Management Improvement Program which aimed at improved financial
management of which accrual accounting was an integral part. This paper is
not intended, however, to be an all inclusive treatment of those subjects.
Also the current problems in accrual accounting will be looked at, not so much
from the standpoint of fully providing an analysis, but with the intent to
emphasize the complexity of the problems, provide a perspective on the status
of accrual accounting today, and provide an understanding of how the current

pr blens relate and in many c; es are caused by the manner in which similar
problems in the past have been encountered and dealt with.
It is necessary that some of the terms to be used in this analysis be
explained.
To bey in with, a ccrua 1 accoun t i n", represents a method of accounting
wherein entries arc made in the accounting records at the time goods and ser-
vices arc purchased or used and as revenues are earned regardless of the time
ordered or actually paid for. The accrual concept matches costs and revenues
to the period in which actual performance occurs.
There arc two terms common to accrual accounting in the Federal Govern-
ment, lixp^u'i t ures re] resent the accounting entry made when goods or services
are actually received or when constructive delivery is made. Constructive
delivery refers to manufacturing contracts where the contractor has performed
work identified to the government, but the end item is not yet physically de-
livered. Costs differ from expenditures in that they represent the actual
utilization of material or equipment on the job. In the case of personnel
services and administrative type functions tiie term is synonymous with expendi-
tures. But where inventories are maintained or equipment is used over a period
of time, a distinct difference exists. The expenditure is recorded on acquisition
of the material or equipment and the cost only when material is drawn from in-
2
ventory and used or through depreciation charges on equipment.
The alternate to accrual accounting is cash accounting . This concept
involves the recording of financial transactions in two instances. An
obligation is recorded when a legal committment to spend is made. In the case
General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked Questions About Accrual
Ac co unt in,-.- i p. the Federal Government
,
(Washington, l-'.C. : Government Printing





of items requiring performance over an extended period, the obligation signifi-
cantly precedes actual performance. In cash accounting a disbursement is re-
corded when actual cash payments are made. This is also referred to as checks
issued. The payment may correspond to the period in which services are actually
provided, but more normally follows the period. In a few cases, cash advances
result in the disbursement preceding performance.*5
The following table demonstrates and relates hypothetical accrual and
cash transactions for the order, manufacture, receipt, and use of material.
TABLE 1




Obligations Expenditures Disbursements Costs
First Year 2,000 300 500 100
Second Year 500 200 600
Third Year 500 200 600
Fourth Year 500 300 400
Fifth Year 200 800 300
Totals 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
The table shows that the totals even out over a five year period; how-
ever, considerable deviation in the entries exists between years. The full
Ibid
. , pp. 2-3.
This example is not held forth as typical of normal accounting transac-
tions. It is designed entirely to emphasize and contrast the differences in
accounting concepts.

72,1 10 million is obligated in the first year representing the acceptance of
the contract that sets the wheels of production in motion. The 300 million
ac rued expenditure Fi ure in the first year represents the portion of the
contract actually completed, and delivered including work in process that has
n ident ' to t! .- c I ,-r. This figure is initially low reflecting the
slack tine required to turn up production. Subsequent years reflect leveling
off at full production until the final year when the contract is actually
completed. The disbursement figure reflects an advance payment to the con-
tractor in the initial year, and irregular progress payments in preceding years.
The increased figure in the fifth year reflects final settlement upon success-
ful completion of the contract. Costs are timed to actual utilization of the
material and van' between years dependent, on job requirements.
Methodology Used
Primary and secondary data for this paper has been collected from many
sources. Much of it has come from governmental publications and documents made
available through contacts with the staff offices of various Congressional Com-
dittoes, the General Accounting Office, the Office of Management and Budget,
the Treasury, the Civil Service Commission, the Department of Defense, the De-
partment of Navy, and Headquarters Marine Corps. Several of these offices were
also very generous in allowing personal interviews and in answering phone in-
quiries
.
The primary sources of library material were the libraries at the Office
of Management and Budget, and the Naval Supply Systems Command. The Army Penta-
gon, the Marine Corps Command and Staff School, and the George Washington Uni-
versity libraries also yielded information.
The approach adhered to in collecting data was to take notes from written

material on 5' by 7» cards. These notes cross referenced to the source page
number. Notes were also taken at interviews and the basic points in the inter-
view were subsequently written out. At the conclusion of the research phase,
index cards were reviewed and topical sheets were originated. Any point on an
index card referring to a topical category was written down by source and page
number. This later enabled quick identification of anything pertaining to a
topic.
Organization of the Studv
The paper, because of its primary emphasis on the evaluation of his-
torical events leading to the present, will be generally organized on the chrono-
logical presentation of milestone events. This should also eliminate some of
the redundancy that otherwise would occur if each of the subsidiary questions
were examined within a separate chapter.
A separate summary will be included in each chapter and will provide a
review of the events of that period and a background to analyzing the subse-
quent chapters.
Chapter II covers early accounting developments, the initial interest in
accrual accounting, and the recommendations and legislation resulting from the
First and Second Hoover Commissions.
Chapter III primarily concentrates on evaluating the results obtained
after more than a decade of operations under the 1950 legislation, as reflected
in the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Government Operations between
1964 and 1968.
Chapter IV discusses the recent emphasis on accrual accounting and problems
encountered since the 1967 President's Commission on Budget Concepts.




EARLY BASIS FOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING
AND THE FIRST AND SECOND HOOVER COMMISSIONS
Early Accounting Developments
Accrual Accounting is a relatively new concept to the Federal Govern-
ment. Prior to the end of World War II, government accounts were maintained
on a cash basis. Cash accounting dealt strictly in obligations and disburse-
ments. This basis did not allow for a reliable measurement of efficiency and
effectiveness since inputs (i.e., the cost of resources utilized) did not con-
sistently relate to outputs in a given period. Cash accounting aimed prima-
rily at assuring that legislated dollar limitations were not exceeded.
The years following the depression and particularly World War II saw a
tremendous acceleration in Government expenditures. The expanded government
brought large numbers of businessmen into contact with the Federal accounting
structure. These individuals were quick to realize that the prevailing cash
basis of accounting simply did not provide adequate data for planning and con-
trolling operations. Accrual Accounting had long been accepted as a standard
of business accounting and the new Government managers were used to the cost
reports that such accrual systems could provide.
Tne first step in improvement came with the passage of the Corporation
Eric L. Kohler and Howard W. Wright, Accounti n g in the Federal Govern-
ment (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1956), pp. 4-o.
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Control Act of 1945. Up to this point, the voluminous independent Government
Corporations emerging from the depression years had been free of Congressional
jurisdiction. The Act brought "business type" accrual budgets and procedures
2
to the corporations and made them subject to Congressional review.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 194b resulted in the creation of
the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department (currently the
Committee on Government Operations). One of the first efforts of this Commit-
tee was to examine the duplication that existed between tiie Government Account-
ing Office, the Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in reporting the monthly
financial status of Departments. This duplication stemmed from a difference in
opinion as to the definition of "obligations'*. The Committee took the role of
mediator in bringing the three agencies together to study and resolve their dif-
ferences. In late 1947, the three agencies agreed that the joint effort should
be conducted on a broader scope with the aim of improving overall Government
accounting and reporting. This initiative began the Joint Accounting Program
which was officially announced by tiie Comptroller-General in October 1948.
First Hoover Commission
The First Hoover Commission was created in 1947 primarily to review the
structural organization of the Federal Departments and Bureaus. Its report on
Budgeting and Accounting published on February 15, 1949, was the first compre-
hensive review of Government Budget and Accounting procedures since the studies
resulting in the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act.
2U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Financial









The Hoover Commission reviewed the basis, procedures, and organization
for Government budgeting and accounting. After due consideration of the facts
involved, the Commission made thirteen recommendations including tne following:
1. ... the I Jgctary concept of the Federal Government should be
based upon functions activities and projects [designated a per-
formance budget],
2. An Accountant General be established under the Secretary of the
Treasury with authority to prescribe general accounting methods
and enforce accounting procedures . . . subject to the approval
of the Comptroller General . . .
5. The accrual basis
r
of accounting should be applied to both revenues
and expenditures.
Recommendations for Accountant General
The second recommendation resulted in the greatest furor. The 1921 Bud-
get and Accounting Act establishing the General Accounting Office had given the
Cor.ptroller-General authority to " . . . prescribe the forms, systems, and pro-
cedures for administrative appropriation and fund control ..." This arrange-
ment was felt necessary to provide tiie Congress the necessary control and over-
view of executive operations. The General Accounting Office involvement in
determining the form of accounting systems was furthered by the Federal Property
and Administrative Act of 1949 which included provisions for the Comptroller-
General to "prescribe principles and standards of accounting for property."
The role of the General Accounting Office in prescribing form and stand-
ards for accounting systems had come under attack prior to tiie Hoover Commission,
In 1932, then President Hoover, attempted to pass through Congress Execu-
tive Order 5959, which would have transferred to the Bureau of the Budget "the
powers and duties now exercised by the General Accounting Office, which relate
°keport of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Budgeting v.nd Account in;;, Herbert Hoover, chairman (Washington,
D.C. : Government Printing office, 1949), pp. 8, 59 and 45.
"Kohler and Wright, Accounting, pp. 78-9.
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the designing, prescribing and installation of accounting forms, systems and
7procedures ..."
President Hoover's rationale was summed up in the nessage accompanying
the bill.
It is not; however, a proper function of an establishment created pri-
L ly for the purpose of auditing Government ace d the
necessary studies and to develop and prescribe accounting systems in-
volving the entire field of Government accounting.
The order was rejected by resolution of the House Committee on Expendi-
tures in the Executive Department, who saw the order as an attack on a vestige
of Congressional power.
An outside viewpoint was provided when the U.S. Chamber of Commerce per-
formed a special study of the Federal accounting organization and subsequently
recommended the creation of a General Accounting Office directly responsible to
the President for establishing accounting principles and prescribing systems.
The Chamber at that time stated:
Since tuc Comptroller-General is not under Executive control, . . .
the Executive is deprived of one of the most essential means of
establishing effective supervision over expenditures, namely a sat-
isfactory* accounting system under Executive Control, Moreover, the
Comptroller-General is now in the anomalous position of auditing his
own accounting.-^
Another independent review of the accounting structure was conducted in
1936 by the Urownlow Commission, appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The Commission disclosed that:
Administration Officers have found it not only necessary to go to
their superior officers for the approval of plans, but also to the
office of the Comptroller-General for the approval of the legality
of forms and procedures. 1^
' Financial Management in tiic Government





lOy.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Expenditures in tiic Executive Depart-
ments
,
To Improve Budgeting and Accounting, and Auditing Methods in the Federal
Government, hearings, before the Committee, olst Cong., 2d. sess., 1'JbO, p. 170.
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lac Brownlow Commission cited and endorsed the ideas expressed in the
Chamber oC Commerce Study; however, the recommendations that evolved differed
slightly in that in lieu of a separate accounting office, the Brownlow Com-
mission advocated placing accounting responsibilities with the Treasury and
redesignating tac Comptroller-General and the General Accounting Office as the
Auditor General and the General Auditing Office respectively.
These recommendations and others were incorporated into Mouse and Senate
Bills and hearings were conducted. The recommendation to divorce the General
Accounting Office front its control of accounting systems was particularly diffi-
cult for Congress to digest. This and other problems resulted in no action be-
ing taken on the proposed legislation.
As an offshoot, a select Senate Committee was appointed to investigate
the organization of the agencies to determine if overlap of functions existed.
This committee, in turn, contracted the Brookings Institute to conduct an ex-
haustive study of the financial organization in Government. 'Hie conclusions
of this study called for redefining the accounting role of the General Account-
ing Office and redesignating it the Office of Auditor and Settlements. Again,
12
no positive action was forthcoming from the Congress.
Finally in 1939, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8248 trans-
ferring the Bureau of the Budget from the Treasury to an independent status.
No mention of the accounting organization was made. According to Lindsay C.
Warren, a member of the House of Representatives at that time and later Comp-
troller-General, the executive order would never have passed Congress unless
President Roosevelt had been persuaded to drop all references to the General
Accounting Office.
Financial .'har.a^'Ment in Government
, pp. 15-16.
12 Ibid
. , pp. 18-20.





This then was the background to which the First Hoover Commission made
its recommendation for an Accountant General in the Treasury.
Actually, the final recommendation was a compromise between the line
taken in the Commission Task Force Report and the views of several members of
the Commission proper.
T. Coleman Andrews headed the Task Force whose seven members also con-
stituted tiie Committee on Federal Government Accounting of the American Insti-
tute of Accountants. Andrews was serving as the Comptroller of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, at the tine and had credentials that included service as a Virginia
State Auditor, and Director of the General Accounting Office's Corporation Audit
• • 14Division.
The Task Force spent fourteen months reviewing the Accounting structure
and found
1. There is no formal accounting plan for the Government as a whole.
2. No one is charged with the responsibility for developing such a
plan.
3. There is no one who would have power to install sucii a plan, and
compel compliance with its provisions if one were developed.
4. The statutes make no provision for eitner a complete accounting
system or a chief accounting officer to direct accounting activities.
The Task Force also embraced the theory that the Comptroller-General in
prescribing the form of accounts and establishing standards was placed in a con-
flicting role by being a party to administrative decisions that he later had to
audit and report on.
These findings led to the recommendation that an Accounting Office be
established within the Executive Offices of the President with the responsibility
14 Ibid
., p. 104.
loTask Force, Reports to the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Brancn of the Government, Fiscal Budgeting and Accounting Activities, (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 89.
16
Ibid.




of establishing and maintaining an accounting system appropriate to the Govern-
ment needs, and that the duties of tiie Comptroller-General be redefined to more
fully realize his auditing capacities. '
The Task Force recommendations met head on with divergent viewpoints of
several members of the Hoover Commission, particularly Congressional members,
who saw the recommendations as an assault on Congress and a change that would
jeopardize the constructive efforts of Joint Accounting Program then underway.
The final recommendation, while advocating creation of an Accountant
General, placed this official in the Treasury and made his actions suoject to
the approval of the Comptroller-General. Lven this compromise was not agreed
to by several members of the Commission. John L. McClellan and Carter Manas co
filed a separate opinion in which the Commission was accused of exceeding its
authority in recommending alterations to the structure and role of an agency
of Congress. They stated that the Comptroller-General had been given the right
to prescribe accounts in the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act, the 1949 Federa!
Property Act, and by language in the last several Independent Office's Appro-
priations Acts that required General Accounting Office approval of property
accounting procedures before funds could be provided for systems development.
Also, they saw no conflict of interests in the Comptroller-General designing
or prescribing accounting systems that he later must audit. This was reported
to be a common practice with public accounting firms. Finally, they held
forth the Joint Accounting Program as the best hope for constructive improve-
18
ment in Government Accounting.
Vice Chairman Dean Acheson also filed a dissent in which lie propounded







questions and that the Joint cooperative effort was getting the job done.
On the other extreme, Commissioners James 11, kowe, Jr. and Ja:;;.,s K,
Pollack submitted separate statements in which they basically supported the
views of the Task Force requiring a separate Accounting Office in either the
Bureau of the Budget or the Treasury, According to Rowe, the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 was based on the false premise that the legislature
needed to control both the auditing and the accounting. He felt accounting
should be an administrative function, and endless delays resulted when the
administrator had to submit ids systems and actions to the General Accounting
Office for approval. The Hoover proposal did not solve the problem since the
proposed Accountant General was responsible to t.ic Comptroller-General for his
performance. This created duplication and tended to more actively involve the
Comptroller-General in day to day management decisions which was a violation
of the separation of power doctrine.
Of interest to later analysis of accounting development, both the Com-
mission report and the dissenting statements of Kowe and Pollack expressed con-
siderable skepticism as to the merits of the Joint Accounting Program as a
permanent measure for corrective and guiding action in accounting programs.
The Hoover report, while commending the voluntary endeavor, expressed concern
that more than voluntary correctives were needed. Rowe and Pollack opinioned













The recommendation for accrual accounting was not given any particular
prominence in the Hoover Commission report. It was lumped with several items
->
-i
in "Other Recommendations" which were simply "endorsed"."'" However, the Task
Force dwelled extensively on the subject.
Describing the existent cash basis of accounting the Task Force stated
V.'c think it is obvious that a basis of accounting that never shows the
Government's true revenues and expenses for any year and that does not
provide positive control of assets, liabilities and appropriations, is
thoroughly inappropriate to the Government's needs.
In opting for accrual accounting, the Task Force continued,
... on the accrual basis, the books would show not just cash receipts
and disbursements, but also essential facts concerning tae financial
affairs of the Government . . . assets, liabilities, revenue, the extent
to which the budget estimates of the revenues have been realized, the
rate at which the appropriations have been spent, the true available
balance of each appropriation and the accumulated costs of operations.
Positive control of assets, liabilities, estimates of incomes, appro-
priations, revenues and expenses would be maintained.
. .
."
The report then related to Congress by making tiie strong assertion that
unless an integrated accrual accounting system was established there could
never be hope of Congress intelligently maintaining control of the purse strings
The financial reporting system which Congress relied on for information was
described as ponderous, obfuscated, and generally unsatisfactory. The Budget
process was bogged down by special requests for information that data from the
24




. , pp. 103-4.
24 Ibid., p. 104.

18
Hiring and Retaining Qualified Accountants
before departing tae recommendations of the Hoover Commission, it is
worthy to note that the Task Force saw a particular problem building in the
hiring cf sufficient quali fied accountants and auditors to do the mammoth job
ahead. The Group urged that personnel policies be adopted that would assure
the attraction c:\<.\ retention of top people. Their recommended efforts included
reclassification of accountants and auditors to properly compensate those who
were professionally qualified and prompt recognition and advancement of out-
standing personnel. These recommendations were not included in t;ie Com-
mission report.
Legislation Ucr-ultin:- From the First iioovcr Commission
Senate 20S4
The Senate was tiie first Congressional branch to incorporate the lioover
recommendations into legislative form. The proposed legislation, S 2054, con-
tained no specific requirement for accrual accounting. Hearings on the bill
began in early 1950, and were remarkably revealing as to emotional and pol-
tical opposition that had built to the Hoover recommendation for an Accountant
General. The great majority of the testimony and statements submitted to the
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments dwelled on this single
subject. Senator John L. McClellan, who was already on record as opposing the
proposal, chaired the hearing.
Herbert Hoover led the support for the bill. Pointing out the near uni-
versal condemnation of Government Accounting, he cited the Corporation Control
Task Force, Budgeting and Accounting Activities, p. 110.
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Act of 1945 as the legislative precedent in establishing executive responsi-
bility for budgeting and accounting and the General Accounting Office's re-
sponsibility for auditing. He acknowledged the compromise inherent in S 2054
and the Hoover Report and stated that some structural change was needed to
solve a problem that had existed for twenty to twenty- five years and was still
not solved. 2"
Task Force member Rowland Lggcr filed a statement in which he also favor-
ed the bill "since Congress was in no nood to deal with fundamental problems of
Accounting." He felt acceptance of tiie compromise measure would facilitate
27later changes.
T. Coleman Andrews opposed the Hoover proposal because it didn't go far
enough. In supporting and reiterating the Accounting Policy Committee's work
on the Task Force, Andrews contended that placing tiie Accountant General in tiie
Treasury and making him responsible to the Comptroller-General was probably
making a bad situation worse. The choice of the Treasury was poor because one
of the greatest problems in the past had been to confuse Treasury "cash"
accounting with management accounting. Eventually, under the proposed arrange-
ment, the two would become entwined. Andrews further stated,
The bill simply creates another bureau with no authority, no power
and very little responsibility beyond that of a purely clerical set
up
The question that must be answered is are we going to organize our
government on the basis of admiration for individuals or on funda-
mental principles.
. . .
Human frailities being what they are our
next Comptroller-General may not be as qualified as Warren. °
Andrews also attacked the Joint Accounting Program as a diffusion of
responsibilities and lacking in permanence. He cited the fact that the Joint
Of









r rain was not begun until after the Hoover Commission was appointed and had
announced it would review the accounting establishment in Government, the infer-
ence being that action was stirred only under the duress of being faced with
investigation. As related by Andrews, one of the Hoover Commission members
had ;; hed him and expressed agreement with the Task Force, but was afraid
of giving too nuch authority to the Administration in office. At this point,
Senator Mundt interrupted the proceedings to indicate that he too did not trust
the administration. Andrews then summarized:
In other words there arc two problems in accepting the Task Force
recommendations (1) a head of General Accounting Office whom
Congress docs not want to offend and (2) Administration that could
not be trusted to install and maintain proper accounting systems. oU
Lining up against the bill, but for entirely different reasons were the
General Accounting Office, Treasury, and Bureau of the Budget. The General
Accounting Office led by Comptroller-General '.','arren was particularly irate.
Various statements submitted by the General Accounting Office stressed six
points: (1) the Hoover Commission exceeded its authority, (2) the recommenda-
tion was a renewal of previous attacks on the General Accounting Office, (3)
Congressional Control would be weakened by the proposed reorganization, (4)
there was nothing unusual in the Comptroller-General establishing a system
which he must later audit, (5) the General Accounting Office auditing would
in fact be made more difficult by the separation of functions, and (6) the Joint
Program was the best means of accomplishing the desired accounting improvements.
Comptroller-General Warren was liberal in his use of emotional and po-
litical innuendoes. In a statement before the Senate Committee, Warren first
- Ibid




, pp. 4 and 5.
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outlined his past background as a Representative in the House and the role he
played in easing President Roosevelt's 1959 Executive Order thru Congress, lie
asserted that the General Accounting Office had continuously served the taxpayers
thru its accounting role by assuring full disclosure of pertinent operating
facts, he cited the "notable progress" already made under the Joint Accounting
Program and the personal leadership he had provided the effort, tie disclosed the
creation in 1943 of an Accounting Systems Division within tiie General Accounting
Office to spearhead tiie General Accounting Office efforts towards better account-
ing, lie stated that the bill [S 2054] represented "... the age-old fight to
shift from Congress to the Executive tiie control over expenditures of public
funds." He alledged that the bill "strikes at the vitals of the General Account-
ing Office and its independence." This last rhetoric led Senators liocys and
Mundt to personally praise lYarrcn, and to announce "nothing should be done to




In testinony delivered towards the conclusion of the Hearings, IVarren
addressed Hoover's appearance before the Committee.
Hoover is merely renewing and continuing his assaults on the General
Accounting Office, but he fails to take account of progress in the
last eighteen years, especially the last nine. Roosevelt was bitterly
antagonistic and hostile too. This is the same old tiling without a
single new idea. Tiie bill would leave the General Accounting Office
your agent with no effective voice in this very important function. J 3
Later, V.'arren continued, "The General Accounting Office stands as the
last great bulwark for the protection of the American taxpayer against the
illegal and erroneous expenditures of the public substance." And in reference
to tiie Joint Program, "We must cast aside all the old suspicions, back-bitings,
"
Ibid
. , pp. 47-55.
"ibid. t pp. 255-55.
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and in some cases hatred." Finally, in one last appeal to Congressional chau-
vinism, "The giants on both sides of the aisles and at both ends of the Capitol
, . .
knew what they were doing" in giving the General Accounting Office con-
trols over accounting systems in the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act. ^
h'j rren also used the occasion to cite various letters he had received
against the proposed legislation and for tne Joint Program. Among these were
several letters from people with experience in Government accounting including
brie Kohler, formerly Department of Defense Comptroller and noted author on
Govern.n en t Accounting.
Frank 11. Weitzel, Assistant to the Comptroller-General, appeared before
the Committee and generally echoed his boss's views. lie stressed that "the day
to day results of the Joint Program were more than sufficient to justify and
assure its continuance." liis testimony elicited the response from Chairman
McClellan, "I'.'e might retard progress uy legislating something experimental"
Walter Frese, the Chief of the General Accounting Office's newly created
Accounting Systems Division, expressed enthusiasm to the Committee about the
"grass roots spirit" prevailing among agencies towards the Joint Accounting
Program.
The Bureau of the Budget views on S 2054 were expressed in letter and
thru the personal appearance of Frederick J. Lawton, Assistant Director of the
Bureau. 'Hie Bureau's line was that the coordinated effort (Joint Accounting
Program) would produce more meaningful results than legislation, and that the
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accomplish the task. 09
Other vies suited to the cession included statements in favor of
tae legislation authored by the Chamber of Commerce tl o pc , he Pennsylvania Economy
League Inc., and Lloyd Morev Certify,) d ; , •3 y, ied Puolic Accountant, and author of a
Government Accounting text in the 1940's.
As would seem a forgone conclusion based on statements made by committee
:
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Also the great majority of those opposing the bill on the principle that, the
present organization would accomplish the job (the General Accounting Office,
Treasury, the Bureau of the budget), ucrc working as a part of the system.
While their arguments warranted careful consideration, they could logically be
suspected of protecting vested interests. The testimony, particularly of the
General Accounting Office representatives, bear out this assumption.
The Senate Committee, in choosing their course, disregarded the Hoover
and Task Force recommendations, the forewarn in^s provided by several previous
Commissions, and the hard fact that after twenty-nine years, the present
accounting structure was acknowledged by all concciTteJ to be unsatisfactory.
Budget and Accounting Act of 11)50
The House waited until the Senate had introduced the modified legisla-
tion and then introduced an identical bill. The Budget and Accounting Pro-
cedures Act was passed on September 12, lL)50. The final bill contained pro-
visions for a performance budget based on unit costs and workloads, and called
for "Acccounting systems that provided full disclosure, adequate information for
operating and budgeting, and effective control over receipts, expenditures,
4
1
funds, property and other assets.' It is these provisions of the Act that
many experts have today claimed constituted a legislated mandate for accrual
accounting. The rationale of proponents of this theory is that only the accrual
basis could provide the necessary cost data to relate to output and to provide
effective control. *-







" er, "IVhy Accrual Accounting," befonso .'lanagcmcnt Journal,
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accounting >y givin authority to prescribe principles, standards, and re-
lated requirements for Accounting. At the same time, the Executive was charged
for the first time with the responsibility for maintaining accounting systems
arid produc ng financial reports. The Comptroller-General was to consult with
the Treasury, the General Accounting Office, and agencies before prescribing
procedures and principles, fie was also to cooperate and assist the agencies in
developing their systems. Finally, the Act endorsed and called for continuance
of the Joint Accounting Program, °
National Security Act, 1949
The National Security Act of 1949 was the result of still another Hoover
Commission report (No. G). Enactment of the legislation authorized the creation
of working capital funds to finance military inventories and commercial type
activities. These "revolving" funds were dependent for continued operations
on revenues generated from customers; therefore, it was imperative that reliable
accounting systems be implemented in their support. Today the revolving funds
arc one of the few areas within the Department of Defense operating on a full
accrual basis.
Accounting Memorandum No. 1
In 1952, the General Accounting Office published Accounting Memorandum
No. 1 to fulfill that portion of the Budget and Accounting Act pertaining to
the prescription of principles. Comptroller-General Warren in a transmittal
letter stated that the "principles" were tentative in that they represented the
best views disclosed thru the Joint Accounting Program, and would be modified
r'inancial ,'[:'.;i;';-.".c;it in the Government, p. 85.
44 Ibid.




as experience dictated. Warren emphasized that the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Director of the bureau of the Budget had participated in the develop-
45
ment of the Memorandum as called for in the Budget and Accounting Act.
The
i
rinciples themselves were r.ore of a general discussion of the
legislative back r >und to the Memorandum and a justification of pood ncccwnt-
ing practices than a firm basis or directive for establishing accounting sys-
tems. Examples of the conciliatory and vague language used arc as follow.
The memorandum was termed a "guide." As already mentioned, comments on the
memorandum were "invited". An approach "worthy of careful consideration" in
supporting budgets was the use of accrued expenditures supplemented by an
analysis of undelivered orders. Accrual techniques should be adapted to the
"useful purposes which the data will serve." Refinement of systems should weigh
"the advantages to be gained against possible added record keeping." Accrual
accounting should be used where results to management will be "significantly
improved." Use of perpetual inventory records "should be weighed against the
expense of extra record keeping." Costs of freight handling, and storage
charges should be included in material costs, "except when the expense of allo-
46
cation these additional charges outweighs the benefits. Little was written
to require the agencies to justify deviations from the broad principles.
The Memorandum outlined supposed advantages to accrual accounting as
compared with the cash accounting.
The accrual basis
. . . reflects a more accurate picture of financial
condition and makes the income and expense or receipt and expenditure
figures more meaningful. The use of the accrual basis materially
strengthens financial control . . . and is essential in the develop-
ment of cost accounting. If accurate unit costs are to be developed,
45
General Accounting Office, Accounting Principles Memorandum No. 1
,
(Washington, D.C.
, 1952), letter of transmittal.
46 Ibid.
, pp. 2, 6, 17, 19, 22, and 52.

it is essential that expenditures be reflected in the period in which
work was performed. . . . Only under the accrual basis is it possible
to arrive at the cost of goods sold or services rendered to be match-
ed against the revenues earned . . . during a given period. 47
Second Ho over Comrii ssion
Three years after the issuance of Accounting Memorandum No. 1, the
Second Hoover Commission convened and again reviewed the Federal Accounting
structure.
This time, the Task Force assigned to do the detailed investigation and
research work was headed by J. Harold Stewart, a former President of the Ameri-
can Institute of Accountants. Recommendations made by the group included:
1. That executive agency budgets be formulated and administered on
a cost basis. (Recommendation 1U)
2. That the executive budget and congressional appropriations be in
terms of estimated annual accrued expenditures . . . (Recommda-
tion 11)
3. That for management purposes, cost based operating budgets be used
to determine fund allocations within the agencies . . . (Recommenda-
tion 14)
4. Tiiat there be established under the Director, a new staff Office
of Accounting in the Bureau of the Budget headed by an Assistant
Director for accounting with powers and duties as follows
(1) To develop and promulgate an overall plan for accounting . . .
consistent with broad policies and standards prescribed by
the Comptroller-General. These broad policies and standards
should continue to be developed in cooperation with the
executive branch.
(2) To expedite, guide, and assist in the introduction of modern
accounting methods. . .
(3) To set reasonable but definite time schedules for per-
formance and to watch progress.
(4) ... to assist actively in the selection, training and
retention of capable personnel
(5) To report at least annually to trie Director of the Bureau with
respect to the status of accounting (He commendation 15)
5. Tnat the selection of agency Comptrollers and the building of com-
petent accounting organizations
. . . through the selection, train-
ing and retention of capable personnel be an important phase of
the guidance and help to be given by the Assistant Director for





0. That Government Accounts be kept on an accrual basis
. . .
(Uec iendati< . 2)
7. In at as c. general policy, reliance be placed upon . opriatc
accrual and cost accounting techniques as a primary means for
aiding the effective management of Government activities.
(Recommendation 22)48
The recommendation for an accrued expenditure budget was a radical departure
from the traditional "obligation" budget; however, the recommendation had been
previously made by the Cooper Committee which had performed a study in 1954
on the fiscal organization within the Department of Defense.
Tne Task Committee believed that enacting appropriations on an accrued
expenditure basis would provide Congress with better control of expenditures.
"Obligation authority" was found deficient in the following areas.
(1) Tne authority extended beyond the year for which enacted. Once appro-
priated, there was no control of the amount used in any one year, short of
Congressional rescission.
(2) Obligation Authority requested did not relate to resources to be used in
performing the job since inventory' balances and other resources purchased in
another year could be used in the program.
(3) Tne obligation basis provided an incentive to use all the authority before
the date it would lapse. This served to support the agency request for funds
in future years.
(4) The definition of obligation had been interpreted differently with the
result that there was no consistency between agencies as to what constituted
an obligation in the accounting records or budget requests.
(5) Control over the deficit or surplus was ineffective as the result of
48Task Force, Report to the Commission on Organization of the Lxecutive
Branch of the Government, liud-.'.et and Accounting [Washington, D.C.: Government





concentrating on obligations which had no bearing to the year in which cash
payments were made.
Changing to an accrued expenditure budget erquired provision of a
separate "Contracting Authority" to assure suppliers and contractors that pay-
i1 for services was available. Adoption of the budget would permit the
Congress to review and grant each years program in its entirety, including the
portion for which contracting authority had been provided in a previous year.
The Task Force also extensively re-examined the Federal Accounting
structure. As it saw the situation, the li)50 Budget and Accounting Act had
established responsibilities on the part of the General Accounting Office and
the Agencies, but. had left the Hxecutive Branch with no really effective leader-
ship. The General Accounting Office was found to have performed commendably,
especially through its Accounting Systems Division, but it did not have the
administrative responsibility or occupy the proper position to ensure that the
agencies adopted proper accounting systems. The Joint Accounting Program had
belied its name. The Comptroller-General had dominated the leadership role.
The bureau of the Budget and Treasury had been followers, particularly the
Bureau. The accomplishments of the program while noteworthy were a "piecemeal
effort" as compared to the overall need for accounting improvements. These
facts led tiie Force to recommend that central stimulus was needed within the
Bureau of the Budget. *
The Hoover Commission report published in 1955 embraced recommendations
for: (1) cost based budgets, (2) administering budgets on a cost basis, (3)
stating the budget on accrued expenditures, (4) establishing a Staff Office of
Accounting in the Bureau of the Budget, (5) promoting the development of
jJ
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, pp. 34 -C.
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competent accounting organizations thru selection, training, and retention
52policies, and (6) maintaining accounts on an accrual basis.* The rationale
used in support of the Hoover Commission recommendations were basically taken
from the Task Force.
The proposal for an accrued cxpcndi ture budget was the only one to cause
disagreement among the Commissioners. Clarence J. Broun, a member of the Mouse
of Representatives, dissented based on the "radical departure from long stand-
ing fiscal policy which would require widespread changes in the entire fiscal
process." He felt additional studies were required by appropriate Congressional
53
committees.
James A. Farley filed a general dissent criticizing the approach taken to
the entire report, which lie claimed was the viewpoint of a cost accountant oper-
ating in a private commercial enterprise run for a profit. Whereas, Farley
acknowledged the appropriate use of tliis type of business accounting concept,
he did not feel an across the board application was appropriate. Referring to
accrual accounting, Farley said,
It does not necessarily provide a measure of the effectiveness of
programs which are not primarily related to profit, but to the per-
formance of proper governmental functions. The transition to cost
basis' accounting will require tremendous expense and inconvenience
and there is insufficient evidence that it will be universally
workable. ->4
Chet Holifield, a member of Congress, also wrote a dissent in which he
expressed doubt that the recommendations would actually tighten Congressional
control and result in improved management and greater economies. Holifield
"Report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch ot
the Government Budget and Accounting
,
Herbert Hoover, chairman (Washington,








could not see how accrual accounting techniques could be applied across the
board with beneficial results. The value of many agencies could not be :. sured
thru cost accounting. "Government is not a profit making organization."
Amending tac budget and Accounting Act of ll 1 ."-."', Public Law .4- v G~
The Accounting recommendations of the second Hoover Commission were put
in legislative form by S 3199. Only the recommendation for an accrued expendi-
ture budget was dropped front the proposed bill. Senator Frederick G. Payne,
author of the bill, indicated that the proposal was omitted because its success
depended on the establishment of an adequate accounting base and the ability to
program effectively. Payne claimed intentions to draft a bill to carry out the
accrued expenditure ideas after the accounting provisions were effective.
The bill included provisions for the development and use of cost based
budgets, establishment of accrual accounting systems, and the creation of a
Staff Office of Accounting within the Bureau of the Budget headed by an Assistant
57Director of Accounting.
This last recommendation raised considerable opposition from the three
Central Agencies (Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, and the General Account-
ing Office)
.
The Bureau of the Budget objected because it claimed to be in the process
of expanding its accounting group to accomplish the objectives sought. The
General Accounting Office did not believe legislation was needed for the Bureau
55 Ibid-,
, pp. 70-1.
56U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Budgeting
and Accounting
,
Hearin gs before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government





to accomplish the desired results. The Treasury felt the proposed statute would
result in an overlap of duties already given the Comptroller-General. *>8
The arguments for a separate Accounting Division in the Bureau of the
Budget were led by Senator Wallace F. Bennett, co-sponsor of the bill, and
J. Harold Stewart, head of the Task Force. Dennett pointed to a conclusion
drawn earlier by the Task Force that a revitalized accounting effort in the
Bureau of the Budget would save approximately four billion dollars a year
through improved management procedures. He felt that while the Comptroller-
General had made considerable progress in the last several years, the new office
in the Bureau of the Budget would be a more effective means of improving and
tightening systems. 9 Stewart, in turn, spoke to the history of the Joint Pro-
gram as a reflection of the leadership of the Comptroller-General, but lacking
in the display of any real Executive Branch initiative. Since accounting was
a tool of management, and the Bureau of the Budget was considered the manage-
ment arm of the President, this seemed the logical place for the power to be
vested. The proper structure envisioned by Stewart would have had the agencies
looking to the Bureau of the Budget for accounting assistance and the General
60
Accounting Office reviewing executive performance as opposed to doing the job.
Considerable attention in the hearing was also devoted to the deleted
provisions for an accrued expenditure budget. Stewart testified that the prob-
lem with obligation authority was that it emphasized utilizing all available
funds to justify future reepjests, and resulted in an administrative problem in
administering thousands of allotments (i.e., the distribution of funds to sub











accounted for). The accrued expenditure budget would provide greater control
to Congress and increased flexibility in the operation of agencies. Congress
would be made aware of the carry over of inventories and unfilled orders that
the agency intended to use in the ensuing year. At the same time, the accrued
expenditure concept would eventually lead to administering budgets on broad cost
limitations, thus eliminating the use of multiple allotments. Since expendi-
tures and costs related to actual receipt and utilization of material and
services, there could be no last minute push to obligate funds. 61
The General Accounting Office made a plea to include the accrued expendi-
ture recommendation in the legislation.
In a letter to Chaiman Kennedy, Comptroller-General Joseph Campbell
[Lindsay Warren was replaced in early 11)52] stated,
3LSe^S .rCaf 0r? able - t0 conclude th <^ the best basic approach to a re-view of the budget is one which provides for (1) consideration of aproposed work plan or program to be accomplished, (2) what was accom-
plished in preceding periods and, (3) costs for both in terms oftotal resources consumed.
. . the budget can then be assessed interns of (a) costs to oe incurred, (b) resources already availablein terms of inventories etc plus carried over funds, and (c) new
money or authority needed. 02
According to Campbell, the advantage to the accrued expenditure concept
was that it gave Congress greater control over the level of operations, and it
directed attention to mission accomplishment at a minimum cost. He countered
the argument that expenditures are the inevitable result of granting obligation
authority with the following statement.
An examination of present day practices in the long lead time area
programing multitudinous changes in engineering plans and spec fi-cattons durang the period of production.
. . . Appropriations on an
61 Ibid., pp. 70-1.
62 Ibid., p. 17.
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accrued expenditure basis would require a type of continuing budget
presentation and -.coyld bring out the adequacy of management planning
or the lack of it.° J
The provisions of S 3199 calling for maintenance of accounts on an accrual
basis were generally accepted by everyone involved in the Hearings. Implementa-
tion of the recomnenuaticn were in fact essential to use of cost based budgets as
specified in other parts of the bill.
The hearings pointed again to the problem of adequate staffing. Stewart
disclosed that his Task Force had found a single super grade civilian employed
within the Department of Defense to perform accounting functions. This compared
with seven super grade billets on the budget staff.
Upon conclusion of the testimony on S 3199, it was agreed that many of the
specifics of the bill could be carried out through administrative action and that
no legislative action was required. Included among these provisions was the sec-
tion requiring a separate Accounting Office in the Bureau of the Budget. Also it
was determined tuat a section should be added requiring submission of an accrued
expenditure budget. Consequently, Chairman Kennedy directed the Comptroller-
General, the Bureau of the Budget, the Treasury, and members of the staff to re-
draft the bill. The revised version, S 3897, was passed thru the Senate in June
1956. 66
By this time, the Bureau of the Budget had acted to create a separate
f "7
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h'ev;s release as contained in: U.S. Bureau of the Budget, "Analysis of
the Budget and Accounting Report of the Commission on Organization of the Govern-
ment", Washington, B.C., 1956.
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The House considered II. R. 11526 a companion bill to 5 3S97 during lay
and June 1956.
_
During the hearings, Clarence Camion, chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations, and John Taber, ranking minority member of the same
committee, leveled broadsides at the provisions for an accrued expenditure bud-
get.
Cannon, in abbreviated testimony laden with emphasis on the guardian of
the purse strings role played by his committee, claimed that the four billion
savings figure attached to implementation of the Hoover recommendations was with-
out substance. If anything, Cannon stated that the proposal for an accrued ex-
penditure budget would cost the government money because use of "Contract Au-
thority" would be required. The past history of Contract Authority reflected
that Congressional review was not as close, thus leading to irresponsible ex-
penditures. Also, the authority preserved rather than eliminated the unexpended
balances that carried forward from year to year.
Taber expressed almost identical views. He explained that Contract Au-
thority was easier to get since the appropriation of a firm dollar limitation
was a year away. Under questioning from one of the bill's sponsors, he stated
that the appropriations committee was already reviewing information on how much
was spent each year on funds appropriated from previous years; therefore, the
accrued expenditure budget provided no particular advantage in the review of con-
tinuing programs. After further questioning, Taber acknowledged that lie had no
69
objections to accounting for fund utilization on an accrual basis.
The arguments from the powerful members of the Appropriation Committee
was sufficient to sway the Committee on Government Operations. In House Report
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Budget and
Accounting
,
Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions
,





2734, which accompanied the reported version of H.R. 11526, the Government
Operations Committee stated:
Tne committee heard strong testimony from the chairman ox the Committee
on Appropriations of the House and the ranking minority member of that
committee objecting to the accrued expenditure device primarily en the
ground tiiat it would necessarily lead to Contract authority for pro-
yond one fiscal year. It w- felt that
i thority weakened ressional Control, and it would not realize the
benefits claimed. On the basis of these objections and the committee's
own study, tne provision for appropriations on an annual accrued ex-
penditure oasis was deleted from tne bill. 7 ^
There is little evidence that the committee conducted any investigation
of the expenditure budget question beyond hearing the testimony of Representa-
tives Cannon and Taber.
Tne amended bill was not agreed to by the Senate. At the conference com-
mittee that followed, three Senate members refused to sign the report without
the provisions for the expenditure budget included. Tne other Senate members
agreed to signing only after they were assured that the next Mouse session would
reconsider the proposal. Public Law 84-S63 was enacted in July 1956, and imple-
mented the Hoover recommendations concerning cost based budgets, accrual account-
ing, and improved property accounting. In the process of compromising the orig-
inal Hoover proposals, the final legislation concerning cost based budgets was
weakened by adding to the requirement the words "to the extent deemed desirable
and practicable by the President." 71 This qualification apparently was a result
of the Bureau of the budget stand that cost based budgets would take considerable
72time to implement.
70
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Letter Percival F. Brundage to Dwight U. Eisenhower as contained in




Atter.pt at An Accru ed L.xp cndi turc Budget
While the legislative background to the accrual accounting controversy
is primarily completed with the study of P.L. 84-863, it is necessary to follow
the accrued expenditure budget proposal through to its conclusion in order to
view the full picture. For the next two years, 1956 - 1958, the fight raged in
7 ^both houses of Congress. The Senate supported the original Hoover proposal;
whereas, the House led by the Appropriations Committee stood fast against any-
thing that would alter the appropriations process. The Appropriations Committee
held hearings and published a report in which the following points were made.
1. Contract Authority went all the way back to 1789, and had proved
unsatisfactory because of the concepts failure to emphasize the
cost implications of starting up a project.
2. The realities of Congress were sucii that Congressional members
did not have time to review the future year implications of a
vote for a single year fund request unless the full amount of the
project was visible.
3. Congress presently reviewed program accomplishment on multiple
year appropriations.
4. If Congress was dissatisfied with the way a program was being
carried out, it could rescind the money.
5. It was impossible to compare Congress and the Board of Directors
of a business because the size of government and the constant
turnover of Congressional personnel made it impossible for
members to be knowledgeable of year to year operations.
6. Contract Authority would increase the number of supplemental
'
^Financial Management in the Government, p. 28.
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budget requests submitted because the same degree of planning
and review would not go into granting the authority.
7. Contract Authority would increase administrative costs as the
result of imposing a second limitation on agencies which would
have to be separately accounted for.
8. The appeal of accrued expenditures and contract authority was
an illusion. In reality it was a distinction without differ-
ence.
9. There was a tendency to pass over Contract Authority lightly.
Once obligations were made there was no choice, but to pay the
bill.
10. The carryover balance that accrued expenditures aimed to
7 A
eliminate was not confined to Appropriations.
In June 1957, the Senate passed a bill through Congress which would have
implemented the Hoover accrued expenditure concept unaltered. Tne House Com-
mittee on Government Operations passed a similar bill; however, the language of
the bill was amended on the House floor to allow that the accrued budget would
be used when the President had determined the establishment of an adequate
accrual accounting system, and if the Congress chose to include the limitations
in appropriation bills. It was this revised bill that finally passed both houses
and was enacted as Public Law 85-759. J
The new legislation had an abortive history. In the 1960 and 1961 budgets,
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several agencies estimates were submitted with proposed expenditure limitations
Congress in each case, though, rejected exercising their option to appropriate
the expenditure limitation. In 1962, Public Law 85-759 expired, and no imme-
diate attempt was made to renew it.
Summary
The early history and legislative background relating to the move to
accrual accounting systems has been established, entering the 1960's the re-
quirement for accrual accounting had been fully recognized and given statutory
weight in the 1956 amendments to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1950.
Mule the requirements of the law seemed clear, the structure and basic
responsibilities for carrying out the legislative intent were obscure. The
Comptroller-General had rigidly prescribed forms and procedures until the 1950
Act. Then in a compromise measure that ignored the advice of not only the
Hoover Commission, but also findings of past studies and the considerable ad-
vice of independent professional accountants, the agencies were given responsi-
bility for implementing accounting systems in accordance with principles and
standards prescribed by the Comptroller-General. However, no one in the Execu-
tive Branch was charged with the responsibility for providing overall coordina-
tion and direction to the program. As a result, the Joint Accounting Program
emerged as a substitute device for motivating and leading the Federal accounting
program. Even this effort lacked Executive involvement. The Comptroller-General
provided most of the impetus to the program. While progress was made under the
program, the Second Hoover Commission Task Force was already confirming the sus-
picions of the First Hoover Commission: that such a cooperative effort could
76 Ibid., pp. 109-19.
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not long endure or accomplish the singularity of purpose required.
The Second Hoover Concussion stressed the need for establishing central
executive direction and believed the Bureau of the Budget to be the logical
choice to assume such responsibilities. Under pressure, the Bureau of the
Budget created an Accounting Division with an Assistant Director as Head,
The early history of accrual accounting application in Government is re-
vealing in several other aspects.
First, although at this stage in time, accrual accounting per se in-
volved no particular controversy, the concept of the accrued expenditure budget
was creating a furor within elements of Congress, particularly the House Appro-
priations Committee who saw the concept as weakening their control of the appro-
priations process.
Second, the first attempt of the General Accounting Office to publish
Accounting Principles took on a conciliatory and ambiguous note that left a
great deal to the interpretation and discretion of the respective agencies.
Third, early problems of staffing were evidenced in spite of warnings
by the First Hoover Commission that this was likely to be a critical problem.
Fourth, the role and interest of the Congressional Committees on Govern-




A REVIEW OF PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING
ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS
1964 Congressional Hearings
Although the literature is sparse, the period of the early 1950 's
apparently saw a push on the part of some agencies to install accrual
accounting systems and to accomplish the other financial improvements
required by law. The record shows that a large number of accounting
systems were submitted to the General Accounting Office for approval dur-
ing the first half of the 1950* s.
The 1956 annual report of the Joint Accounting Program claimed many
financial management improvements had been made (e.g.
,
use of forty- six
2
cost based presentations in the 1053 Budget).
In 1957 the new Accounting Office within the Bureau of the Budget
published Bulletin 57-5 which directed agencies to review their financial
systems in light of the new legislation, and to submit a planned program
for improvement. These responses were to be examined by the three Central
agencies under the Joint Accounting Program who in turn were to discuss
U.S. Congress, liouse, Committee on Government Operations, Submissions
of Agency Accounting Systems for GAP Approva l , Hearings before a subcommittee
of the Committee on Government Operations, liouse of Representatives, SSth Cong.,
2d sess., 1964, pp. 69-75.
2
Joint Program to Improve Accounting in the Federal Government, ot;i
Annual Progress Report
,





problems with the agencies in an attempt to expedite the changes re-
quired.
That these efforts and the atteir.pt to impose Accrual Accounting
Systems on the agencies were not very successful became obvious in 1964
when the House Committee on Government Operations decided to hold hear-
ings on the progress being made. The Comptroller-General had been
given the authority in the legislation already described to review and
approve accounting systems tiiat met the published standards and principles
In early 1964, Comptroller-General Campbell made it known that only
forty-one of the one hundred twenty-eight Civil Departments and one De-
fense accounting systems had been approved. (See Appendix I) This dis-
closure led to the first of four hearings held between 1964 and 1968. It
should be pointed out that while accrual accounting was not the sole re-
quirement for the General Accounting Office systems approval, it was the
central requirement, and the one causing the most difficulty in getting
systems approved.
During the 1964 hearing, statements from only the three central
agencies (i.e., the General Accounting Office, Bureau of the Budget and
the Treasury) and the Civil Service Commission were considered.
The Comptroller-General pointed to several contributing factors
to the deplorable condition that existed.
(1) The size, complexity, and changing nature of many Federal
Departments complicated devising adequate accounting systems.
(2) Lack of interest by managers in fulfilling accounting re-
sponsibilities.
(5) Lack of enthusiasm for changing old procedures.
Ibid.




(4) Lack of understanding as to how accrual data aided the manager.
(5) Failure to assign sufficient personnel or devote sufficient
funds to do the job.
His testimony also highlighted the absence of General Accounting Office's
authority to require agencies to submit their systems for approval , and the
time required in reviewing and approving a system once submitted. In the
latter respect, it was explained that the approval process might take well
4
over a year.
The most revealing testimony was delivered by William J. Armstrong and
Timothy L; . Russell, both of the Office of Financial Management in the Bureau
of the Budget. Armstrong's opening statement cautioned against using the
number of systems approved as the only measure of accounting progress. He
contended that requirements to continuously update systems in line with new
programs and interpretations of related accounting principles considerably
delayed systems approved. The delay was also extended by the need to arbi-
trate differences of opinion with the General Accounting Office and to docu-
ment system manuals. Armstrong used the Atomic Energy Commission System
as an example of the time involved. This system had taken four years to
5
approve from the date it was submitted.
Armstrong cited the increased use of cost based budgets, and claimed
that many agencies had begun to question the requirement for use of the
budget as the result of the House Appropriations Committee insistence on
requiring a second budget on the obligation basis."
He then provided insight to the role the Bureau had taken in Accounting
Submissions of Agency Accounting Systems
,
Hearings, 1064, pp. 6-7.
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development* This resulted from a discussion of some differences in opinion
between the agencies and the General Accounting Office. As an example,
Bulletin S7-5 had been interpreted by the agencies as requiring the con-
version of obligation data to accrued expenditure data op. an annual basis
in those areas where cost data was not used in day to day operations. The
General Accounting Office felt that the conversion should be on a monthly
basis, and in 1962 had published a memorandum dictating at least a monthly
conversion. Many of the agencies felt the conversion too costly and of no
benefit. The agencies were arguing with the General Accounting Office,
and in some cases refusing to change over until a trial had proved the
change effective, and efficient.
This revelation brought a pointed response from the Cornittee.
V.hy doesn't the Bureau of the Budget back up the General Accounting
Office and tell t'he agencies instead of testing and arguing to meet the
standards. ... It seems that the Bureau . , . h;>?n't taken a firm
stand. Don't you have a duty to follow up more vigorously than you
have?
Armstrong. I think that the Bureau of the Budget has been supporting the
General Accounting Office statement of principles. Last year
. . .
the steering committees of the joint program met with most the large
agencies to talk about these specific tilings.
Committee Member. Still you allow the agencies to test, to argue about
the various standards. Mi at have you done to follow up on this May 19,
1964, letter? [Comptroller-General's letter to Agencies calling atten-
tion to the poor status of systems approved.]
Armstrong. No, we haven't taken any action as a result of that. This is
a further action by the Comptroller-General to try and speed them up.
Committee Member. IVherc does the Bureau of the Budget fit in the picture
other than meeting in this joint committee? Do you feel you have any
responsibility in directing the agencies to comply?
Armstrong. I don't know exactly what you mean by "directing to comply".
In our Bulletin 57-5 we laid down the requirements of law; wc referred
to the General Accounting Office principles; we set our criteria that
should be followed by the agencies and we asked for annual reports on
progress. Do you mean something in addition to that?

Committee Member. Yes. It would seem to r.e that if any of the agencies
have authority to speed up the operating agencies it is the Bureau of
the Budget. Do you feel tiiat is a fair interpretation?




. . . We do it jointly since this is
a joint program. We do not go off separately and deal with an agency
on sucii problems.
Later on, Mr. Russell continued.
T think throughout this program we have followed the directive of
Congress in section 115-A of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act
of 1950, that the responsibility is on the head of the Department to
set up adequate accounting systems. We rely heavily on that. Insofar
as the Bureau of the Budget is concerned we have assidiously avoided
the situation where we would move in attempt to do the job ourselves.
Committee Member. It seems to be that the agency has the initiative to
establish the system. If the system falls short of standards, that
something more has to be done. All you fellows have done from that
point is continue discussion and persuasion.
Russell.
. . .
that is exactly what we have done. We have a problem in
attempting to assure these people that some of the technical changes
we want them to make would really be good for them. . . .
Committee Member. The difference between you and me . . . is that you
seen to think they are the final arbitrator of whether their system
is good for then.
Russell. In terms of accounting principles this is very true. . . .
At this point, Committee Chairman William L. Dawson reprimanded the Bureau
of the Budget representatives.
We have a new system in our country, because that is the way the
laws are supposed to operate. They [agencies] either have a job to
do or not do. They are either going to carry out the law or they
are not. It is your job to see that the law is enforced. Why don't
you be a good policeman?
Armstrong. We are trying to carry out the law. We ask for tiic target
dates.
Dawson in apparent disgust. Fourteen or fifteen years, and they haven't
done them vet, and you are still asking them to please co inly with the
law. 7
Ibid
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The testimony by the Bureau of representatives also reflected a part
of their problem in enforcing the installation of systems. Armstrong dis-
cussed the May 19th Comptroller-General letter in which the General
Accounting Office announced that the audit program was being adjusted to
encompass a review of the agencies whole financial system. The change in
emphasis would result in reports providing information that the Bureau had
not had in the past. They had previously relied on the annual reports re-
quired by Bulletin 57-5 to obtain information on which to evaluate progress.
The disclosure reflected the inadequate staff within the Bureau to conduct
any type of on site review or follow up to directives.
Anotner question addressed was the reasonableness of time schedules
in developing and submitting systems for the General Accounting Office
approval. Although no direct answer was provided, the Bureau of the Budget
9implied that three to four years should be sufficient.
The Treasury Department, in appearing before the Committee, outlined
their concern for good financial management as related to the need for
central reporting, disbursing, and cash management. In this area, the
Treasury believed the agencies were doing an effective job. Progress made
by the agencies had led the Treasury in 1960 to begin publishing annual
financial statements showing liabilities and year end balances of unobligated
and obligated, but unpaid appropriations. This data was possible only through
use of accrual accounting or the conversion of obligation data. The Treasury
acknowledged that some large areas (e.g., Department of Defense) were not
complying with the requirements and that others complying were using the con-
10











The Treasury advanced an argument for accrual accounting that only
cost data provided a significant relation to the period in which work was
performed. This relation provided a challenge for management to increase
production and reduce cost. If management would realize the potential bene-
fit, accrual accounting would come into being.
Their testimony also stressed that the new General Accounting Office
audit procedures would permit greater visibility of the true accounting pro-
gress being made. Past reports submitted under the Bureau of the Budget
Bulletin 57-5 and compiled into progress reports included in the annual Joint
Financial Management Improvement Program report were distorted because they
gave only the agencies own evaluations. In the past, the Treasury recognized
that the General Accounting Office was the only agency staffed to work on
the front lines with the agencies. The Bureau of the Budget and Treasury
12
relied on the written and spoken work.
House Report N'o. 170
As a result of the 1964 hearing, the Committee on Government Operations
published House Report No. 179 in which it was found:
1. That the provisions of the 1950 Budget and Accounting Act requiring
accounting systems to be established in accordance with principles
prescribed by the Comptroller-General had not been complied with.
2. An apparent lack of interest existed among agency officials.
3. The Comptroller-General had the right to approve or reject systems.
Failure to comply with his determinations constituted a violation
of the law.
11 Ibid





4. Congress had the right to expect agency compliance with the law
and determinations made under the law.
5. Many agencies were operating with inadequate control over Govern-
ment resources.
6. Agencies had distressingly put accrual accounting into use on a
piece neal basis.
7. The Bureau of the Budget had discussed accounting problems ex-
tensively with the agencies, but the outlooks for discussion did
not seem promising. Some r.iore positive action appeared needed.
8. The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program gave rise to
"an unduly rosy description" of the present status of agency
accounting systems.
9. The Comptroller-General should have taken steps prior to May 1964
ir. pressing for systems submissions. It would appear that a
policy of direct assistance to delinquent agencies should have
been followed.
10. The Civil Service Commission had limited financial training
primarily to the Washington area. Efforts to upgrade financial
management positions had been late (i.e., 11)53). Those agencies
most in need of training as indicated by the status reports had
shown the least interest.
These findings led the Committee to make recommendations that:
1. The agencies promptly take efforts to establish approved account-
ing systems, and to establish target dates to be adhered to for
submitting systems to the Comptroller-General.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations; Submissions
of Agency Accounting Systems for GAP Approval , H. Kept. 179, S9th Cong. , 1st
sess. , 196S, pp. 5-0.
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2. The Bureau of the Budget and Treasury should take more
vigorous action in spurring the submission of accounting systems.
5. The Comptroller-General intensify his review of accounting
systems and provide assistance to the agencies in developing
systems.
4. Increased emphasis be given to career development programs, anil
improved techniques for evaluating the quality of candidates
for financial management positions.
5. Ilorc financial management courses be included in Civil Service
general management training.
6. More consideration be given by the agencies to attending financial
management courses in civilian institutions.
1966 Congressional Hearings
House Report 179 had announced the intentions of the Committee to hold
further proceedings in which the agencies would be heard. This led to a
hearing in September 1966. Although eighteen months had passed since the
first review, the status of approved accounting systems had barely improved.
Only fifty-five of the one hundred fifty systems subject to approval or thirty
eight percent were approved. (See Appendix I)
In spite of the intention to get first hand information from the
agencies, only the Department of Health Lducation and Welfare testified.
The majority of the time was spent in hearing the new Comptroller-General,
Elmer B. Staats, and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, John W.





Accounting Office had been four.J weak by House Report 179. He told how the
General Accounting office had increased the time and effort devoted to re-
viewing agency financial management matters and his staff had been placed
under orders to provide the agencies all encouragement and stimulus possible.
The Accounting Policy Staff had been increased fror.i fifty to two hundred
fifteen people to work solely with the agencies.
The accounting principles first published in 1952 had been revised
in 1965 to take into account the various changes that had been effected by
separate correspondence over the years. The new principles will later be
examined in some detail.
A review guide "to provide additional assistance to federal agencies
in developing their accounting systems to the point where they are adequate
..." followed the principles in April 1966. The guide, presented in a
series of questions about systems development, provided a step by step guide
to the requirements in submitting systems to the General Accounting Office.
Staats then elaborated on new developments since the earlier Hearing.
Detailed discussions with the agencies had revealed that one of the most
pressing problems arising in complying with the law was the shortage of quali-
fied and trained staff. As a result, the Civil Service Commission had been
1
8
invited to participate in the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program.
Staats brought to the committee's attention a memorandum to all Federal
departments dated Hay 24, 1966, in which President Lyndon B. Johnson had lent
ll>U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Submissions
of ^icncy Accov.t i
r
«" Syst ov^ for GAP Approval - 1966, Hear ing before a sub-
committee of tiie Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives,
89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966, pp. 5, 4, and 30.
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his personal support to the move towards better financial management. Johnson
urged tiiat: (1) accounting systems conform, to the prescribed principles, (2)
a vigorous program of recruiting top financial people be developed, (3) finan-
cial reports provide adequate support to the now Government wide Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System, and (4) managers be given the basic tools of
cost based budgets and financial reports that assured maximum cost reduction.
Planning, Programming, and budgeting (PPB) introduced within the Depart-
ment of Defense in the liarly li^O's, had been made a requirement for all
agencies in 1965. The system provided a framework for projecting cost esti-
mates in terms of broad programs and available alternatives over an extended
period. The establishment of the system provided an impetus to the move to-
wards accrual accounting since to be successful actual program costs had to
on
be reliably collected and compared in the same format programmed.'
At the conclusion of Staats' statement, the Committee questioned him
on the continued slippage in time limits for submitting systems for approval.
Staats claimed than recent meetings with the agencies had resulted in be-
ginnning to get more realistic schedules. Two of the problems in the past
had been lack of Presidential interest and doubts on the part of the agencies
as to how serious the Congress was. lie pointed to the fact that current
2
1
deadlines did not, except in a few cases, extend beyond 196S.
Turning his attention to the appropriations process, Staats implied
that the Appropriations Committee was more concerned with annual authority










IVe 11, do you think that perhaps the Congress itself may >c
responsible? En other words, perhaps a part of the resistance of
some of tiie Federal agencies in adopting your approved accountin
system is a result of tiie Appropriations Committees of the House
and the Senate not favoring or perhaps not insisting upon the new
systems because they are too familiar and comfortable with the
old procedures.
Staats replied. Perhaps the interest of the appropriations committee
has not been as„clearly or sharply expressed as the interests of
this committee."
Staats 1 testimony also revealed the late start of the Civil Service
Commission in developing training programs to aid in improved financial
management. In speaking on Commission efforts to work out an intra-agency
study program, Staats indicated that the program had begun only in the
proceeding six months. *"
James F. Kelly, Comptroller of HEW, was preceded by a General Account-
ing Office representative who laid the groundwork for evaluating the HEW
testimony. It was pointed out to the committee that HEW had none of its
eight systems approved. At the 1964 Hearing, none of them were even
scheduled for submission. However, in early 1965, a date of July 1965 was
given for submitting the system for the Office of the Secretary. This
system was to become the model for submitting the other systems. The Office
of Secretary System was never submitted. Based on the General Accounting
Office's displeasure at the piecemeal approach, a revised schedule was
developed which included plans for all Department systems. The Office of
Secretary System was scheduled for December 1966, three systems for December
1967, and three systems for December 1968. Inspection had led the General
Accounting Office to believe that inadequate planning and staffing was be-










When Kelly took the stand, he spoke primarily to four problems.
1. The shortage of a qualified systems accountant staff throughout
the Department.
2. The turnover of available personnel.
3. Attention being directed avvay from systems development and to
day to day problems as the result of MiW's rapid expansion.
4. Determining the best way to record costs on grants given to the
states.
In the later case, the question that arose was whether the accrual concept
allowed simultaneous obligation and expensing when the money was given to
the state or whether some type of report was required from the agency as to
the time frame in which funds were actually spent."
1967 Congressional bearings
Kelly's testimony concluded the abbreviated hearing; however, the
Committee announced that it would continue the investigation at a later
date. Consequently, hearings opened a third time in July 1967. By then,
the overall status of approved systems had siiown slight improvement. As
detailed in Appendix I, sixty of the one hundred fifty-four or 38. 9% of
the civilian department systems were approved.
The 1967 Hearings concentrated on reviewing the agency side of the
picture. Questionnaires were sent out to selected agencies, and additionally,
several Departments were invited to appear in person.
Comptroller-General Staats led off the hearing and related that the
Office of Policy and Special Studies had been designated as the focal point
within the General Accounting Office to assist agencies and view progress.
25
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This new emphasis was accompanied by a change in review and approval pro-
cedures. A third step requiring submission of principles and standards under-
lying systems was added to the existing requirement of approving systems
design and systems in operation. It was hoped that the new step would assure
agreement between the agencies and the General Accounting Office before great
time and effort was spent in more detailed systems development. The new step
would also reduce the time the General Accounting Office spent in reviewing
and approving systems. The change was incorporated into the General Account-
ing Office Policy and Procedures Manual in May 1967. *-°
Another improvement attained was tiic identification by the Joint
Financial Management Improvement Program Steering Committee of several cases
where accounting data was providing managers cost and financial information
that was being advantageously used in daily operations. These cases had
27been written up and distributed to all the agencies.
A final initiative announced was the inclusion of the Civil Service
Commission Chairman as a principal member of the Joint Financial Management
Improvement Program. This move came as the result of repeated complaints
from the agencies of not being able to find sufficient competent people to
get the job done. 28
Staats concluded by stating that a significant increase in executive
agency activity had been directed towards establishing useful and approvable
accounting systems.
26 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Rat e of
Progress Being, Made by Government .Vcncics in . ! e e t i n g t he Requi rer.cn t .'- >m
tiic iiuu,;'et' a;:": ..ccount in,.
.
Procedur e's Act of 1~50, He arings before a sub-
committee of the Committee on Government Operations, Mouse of Representatives,
90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 4-6.
27 Ibid.







During the question period that followed, Staats stated that in the
case of some of the smaller agencies, where costs were primarily in the
nature of personnel services and support costs, accrual accounting was not
considered very important. He also identified a problem in Congress not
funding costs for additional people to install improved Accounting systems.
A committee question concerning the cost saving result in.g from installation of
accrual systems elicited the response that saving could not be readily mcasur-
ed. 2 9
The discussion led to the organization and operation of the Joint
Financial .Management Improvement Frogram. It was disclosed that the chair-
manship of the sterring committee was rotated each year among the agencies,
and that the committee met bi-weekly. Staats indicated that recently there
had been only two meetings of the principles and that this was perhaps not
as many as there might have been. He continued,
I think it [JFMIP] is a very useful arrangement even if it did
nothing more tnan exchange information about what each agency is
doing in their respective fields . . . They put out an annual re-
port too, which is a project sponsored by the four agencies now.
At this point, Mr. Weltzel of the General Accounting Office interjected,
I know Mr. Staats would not claim the credit, but ... he is
the one person who has done the most to revitalize (italics mine)
the JFMIP.
. . .
There have been meetings which we have not had
before.
Mr. Hardy of the committee observed:
It occurs to me where you have three heads you might not
have any.
Keitzel replied,
U'e did not have any chairman, as I recall, of the steering
committee for years. It was just last year that we adopted the
new procedure of having a rotating chairman. 00
29
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Later, Darlington Denit, Director of tiic Office of Survey and Revi
in tiie Department of the Interior, also addressed the Joint Financial Manage-
ment Improvement Prop ran.
I do not think the financial management improvement program has
operated on a direct assistance basis to any departments. By the
assembly of financial management improvement projects reported to
the Budget Bureau annually and the redistribution or publication
of those, one can by sharing the experience of other departments,
get some insight into areas where there might be improvements, but
I am not aware that any agency of Government, control agency or
otherwise, has to this point prescribed any principles or proce-
dures for adapting to the PPB for example. 3 *
These comments provide direct indication that the Joint Financial Management
Improvement Program, although a positive force, was considerably less than
the powerful source of coordination, direction, and leadership described by
Lindsay Warren, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Treasury at the time of
the hearings on the First Hoover Commission recommendations.
Philip S. Hughes, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, addressed
the criticism leveled against the Bureau in House Report 179. According to
Hughes, much progress had been made since that time. The examiners in the
Bureau had been actively working with the agencies on improving accounting
systems and in developing cost information in budget presentations. The
installation of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting had provided a thrust
to the generation of more meaningful accounting data. This emphasis was
being carried out by the examiners with guidance provided from the Office of
Financial .Management. The annual report of tiie Joint Financial Management
Improvement Program had highlighted the 196 4 hearings, and as a result of
Bulletin No. 65-9, agency improvement efforts were reported to the Bureau
for evaluation and follow-ups. Action taken stressed the need for earlier






Bulletins ( -. and 66-3 also emphasized t'ae need for pr mpter agency action
in the accrual accounting and cost budget areas, and in the recruitment and
training of qualified financial personnel. The Bureau stressed that dates
were finally firming up.
Hughes candidly admitted that the lead role in accounting systems
development, and In the progress made belonged to the General Accounting
Office. According to Hughes, the Bureau's "limited size and diverse responsi-
bilities require that our role be primarily one of leadership stimulation
and periodic review of status." The leadership role was fulfilled thru the
budget examiners assigned to the agencies.
The Departments of Labor, Interior, Agriculture, and HEW discussed
accounting problems and progress from the agency side.
Tiie Department of Labor, with none of its three systems approved,
stated tiiat their efforts at improved accounting had begun in earnest only
three years earlier. Prior to this date, no centralized direction had been
provided. Progress had still been slow since the magnitude of the job had
been underestimated. In 1965, the accounting staff of the Department was
increased from two to six system accountants. The installment of new pro-
grams under the Manpower Development and Training Act had repeatedly pointed
to the need for better financial information. As a result, new procedures
for administrative control of funds, and a departmental general ledger
accounting system were implemented, a computer based property accounting
system was installed, and the firm of Touche, Moss, Daily, and Smart was
contracted to develop a Departmental cost accounting system and a complete







loyment security agencies, This contract was to cost $1,016,000 and pro-
vided that the system would be operative starting July 1, 1968, and imple-
mented by September 30, 1968. 34
Darlington Denit of the Department of the Interior told the Committee:
Despite the implications of tiie 1950 amendments to the Budget and
Accounting Act and Public Law 84-863, . . . top management in most
Federal agencies has been preoccupied with the stewardship or custo-
dianship phase of finance. . . . This stress misplaced if you will
has been encouraged by persistent demands that appropriation requests
be stated and justified en an obligation and expenditure basis. . . .
If top management made demands on financial officers for data, the
data requested were controlled by the theme of "how much of the
appropriation authority granted to us has been committed. "35
Denit then claimed that the Interior record had been relatively good with seven
systems approved between 1950 and 1953. The period 1958 to 1965 saw a slacking
off of effort. This had the effect of discouraging good financial systems
people from staying on or being attracted to the Department. In 1965, how-
ever, the Office of Survey and Review which Denit headed was created. Result-
ing! y, documented accounting systems were submitted to the General Account-
ing Office for all delinquent agencies. When the 1966 Presidential memoran-
dum on Planning, Programming, and budgeting and the General Accounting Office
three step submission procedures were issued, Interior felt it necessary to
withdraw all systems to take cognizance of the changes. Eight systems were
in t'ne process of being revised. One of the systems was being developed by
•7/1
the Management Assistance Corporation for $100,000.
Denit 's testimony brought out the fact that most of t'ae systems pre-
viously approved in the 1950-1958 time phase were just as badly in need of
revision as the systems recently withdrawn and being worked on. This
' Ibid
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revelation led tc an exchange in which the Committee expressed displeasure
at the "rough shape" Interior appeared in and the seeming lack of effort
being taken on any but the one system being developed by contract. The
c< nittee staff was directed to get together with the General Accounting Office
and Interior and made a special review of the situation.
^
The Department of Agriculture, with five of its fifteen systcr.s
approved, likewise found themselves under attack by the Committee. Charles
L. Grant, Director of finance, delivered a statement in which the following
points were made. Between 1930 and 1961 numerous systems were submitted to
the General Accounting Office. Many of these had been withdrawn by the
Department or rejected by the General Accounting Office. Eight systems
were returned in 11)65 because they didn't take into account the monthly re-
quirement for converting obligation to accrual data or depreciation expense.
A renewed effort was spurred in 1965 and four systems were forwarded to the
Comptroller-General. Three other systems had been ready for submission
except the General Accounting Office requirement that systems be operative
had been misunderstood. To accomplish the current development effort, the
systems staff had been increased by forty per cent and contracts for
$5,500 and $47,000 had been let. It was also anticipated that several
additional contracts might have to be awarded before all fifteen systems
38
were approved.
Grant's testimony again raised the question of the time required for
submitting systems to the General Accounting Office, and the delay in approv-
ing the system once submitted. In the later case, Grant explained that tiie
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conditions under which principles had to be applied. The use of the quali-
fying word "generally" was given as an example. This situation resulted in
the need to bargain with the General Accounting Office on the extent to
which a principle Siad to be applied. Reconciling the differences took time.
HEW was the last agency to be heard. James F. Kelly, Assistant
Secretary of the Comptroller Department, described the "umbrella system"
under development that aimed at providing a framework for integrated De-
partmental Accounting. The system had been submitted to the General Account-
ing Office for approval and/or advice.
Kelly reiterated the grant problem facing HEW. This lie saw as a
balancing of the opposing interests for eliminating needless reports that
impaired state and university management, and the need for improved, and
more effective management of the grant programs. °
He also revealed that the HEW effort was requiring seventy-eight
billets, plus five new billets were being requested in the current budget.
Additionally, the Department had outstanding system development contracts
for $29,614; $38,000; $93,000; and 591,500. 'lore contracts were anticipated.
As previously mentioned, the Committee considered responses to
questionnaires sent to various agencies. Several of the problems disclosed
warrant examination.
The State Department emphasized difficulties caused by the physical
separation of its facilities. Foreign Affairs for instance was operated
through central Washington offices, one hundred eighteen embassies, and
one hundred sixty overseas posts, and provided reimburseables support to
39
Ibid
. , p . 75
.
40 Ibid







fifty other Governmental agencies. The Department also stated that
questions as to the degree of detail required for property, applied cost,
arid accrual accounting remained unresolved. Evaluations within the De-
part ?nt had resulted in a concensus opinion that the cost of accrual
.1 ~>
data far outweighed the benefits.
The Defense Department spoke to its efforts (designated Project
Prime) to establish an accrual accounting system for operations and main-
tenance funds, whereby one hundred percent of the resources used by a
commander would be charged to him. Free use of military and certain
statistical charges would be eliminated. The system had run into a
stumbling block when the House Appropriations Committee has refused to
fund development costs and urged further study of the principles involved.
The HEW and Department of the Interior responses both identified
the procurement of additional professional accountants and the education
of financial and program people as the biggest problems they faced in
delaying the development of accounting systems. The Small Business Admin-
istration similarly identified a recruitment and retention policy.
The 1967 Hearings were followed by a published report (House Report
1159) in which the following findings were enumerated.
1. There has been a notable increase in the activity to produce
adequate accounting systems.
2. There was a noticeable increase among agencies in the realiza-
tion of t'ae potential benefits of good accounting data.
3. The General Accounting Office has increased the amount of
42 Ibid
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cooperative effort being provided the agencies.
4. Sanctions against delinquent agencies may be necessary.
5. The Bureau of the Budget has been more vigorous in their
recent efforts; however, ste • jr action may be needed.
6. Systems approved prior to 11)05 need to be re-examined. This
procedure should be formalized.
7. The Civil Service Commission lias picked up its recruitment
and training programs. Lack of Funding was hampering the
training effort.
These findings led the Committee to recommend that:
1. The General Accounting Office should publish an annual report
on accounting progress.
2. Good examples of the use of accounting systems should continue
to be circulated.
3. Previously approved systems should be reviewed under a
formalized procedure.
4. The Bureau of the Budget should work more effectively in per-
suading agencies to make improvements and in promoting the
use of cost data.
5. The Civil Service Commission should maintain close liaison
with the agencies to ascertain that courses are in line with
their needs and to solve funding problems in sending personnel
to tiie courses.
6. Agencies should send both financial and management people to
the appropriate Civil Service Course.
u.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Submissions
of Agency Accounting Systems for GAP Approval (Second Review), ii. Rep I . TTbO',
cJQth Cong., 2d sess., 196S, p. 3.
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7. Realistic target dates for submitting agency systems to the
General Accounting Office should be established and adhered
to.
8. The Appropriations Committee should give special consideration
46
to funding accounting systems improvement work.
In discussing the Bureau of the Budget, the report stated,
Nominal leadership and suggested stimulation arc of little value
unless there is a followup with concrete action. The Budget Bureau. . .
should have sufficient staff to enable it to keep informed for develop-
ments in agencies and take whatever action may be necessary to
eliminate the perennial foot-dragging. We are concerned that the
Bureau presently does not appear to have staff capability to do
this. 47
The views of" the Committee were summarized:
There is no excuse for delay in enforcing trie Budget and Account-
ing Procedures Act of 1950, as amended. Rising costs of Government
accentuates the essentiality for prompt modernization of its account-
ing systems. Until this is done, the control of day to day operations
is inadequate, because these should be determined on the basis of
cost rather than on the basis of obligation. °
This did not complete the Hearings on Agency progress. In 1963, an
additional hearing was held. However, its purpose was to provide a showcase
to display the Labor Department Accounting system that had been developed
49
through the million dollar contract.
Looking in retrospect at the 1964 - 1968 hearings held by the House
Committee on Government Operations, the statistics in Appendix I reveal that
when the first hearing began in 1964, thirty- two percent of the agencies had
46 T , . . - ,Ioid





49The verbatim record of the hearing is contained in U.S.* Congress
,
House, Committee on Government Operations. A Review of Labor Pepnrtmcnt
Accounting Systems
, Hearings before a subcommittee ol tiie committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 2d scss., 1968.
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approved accounting systems in operation. This percentage was increased
slightly for each of the hearings up to 1968 when forty-two percent of the
systems were reported as being approved. In viewing this figure by iteslf,
only a ir.odest improvement is indicated.
This index must be qualified by two counter and immeasureable factors.
The index does not indicate the totality of management effort since the
approval was the last step in recognizing effort, end night then be denied as
the result of a single part of system not meeting the prescribed principles.
On the other hand, the statistics do not weigh the size and complexity of the
systems subject to approval. The Department of Defense which accounts for a
large percentage of total Federal outlays (approximately forty percent in
FY 71), had only one approved system by December 31, 1963. Appendix I covers
just the Civil Departments. Then, if the "Independent Agencies" are excluded
from Appendix I and the record of the remaining major Departments is con-
sidered by itself, the approval percentage is decreased to a meager twenty-
four percent in 1964 and 28.4° in 1968.
Summary
The series of Hearings between 1964 and 196S showed that the accomplish-
ments and progress anticipated by Congress, the General Accounting Office, the
Bureau of the Budget, the Treasury and others in 1950 and 1956 had not been
realized. The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program had not proved
effective as a leadership device for accounting improvement. The Bureau of the
Budget and Treasury had taken a back seat to the Comptroller-General. Yet the
The 1968 statistics are derived from the Comptroller-General's first
report to Congress on improvements being made in agency accounting systems. See
U.S. Congress, House, Progress, and Problems Relating to Improvement of Federal
Agency Accounting Systems as of December 51, 1968, ': - 115598 , Report of the
Comptroller boncral ot the United States, yist Long. , 1st sess., 1969, pp. 85-95,
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Comptroller-General had no authority to force agencies to comply or adopt the
principles and standards he prescribed.
The Bureau of the budget, although having designated a Financial Manage-
ment Office with accounting system responsibilities, had not staff;- J adequately
to do much more than "encourage" agencies and "collect reports" on progress.
The Comptroller-General recognized the problem and attempted to fill the
vacancy by increasing his Accounting Policy Office four fold and assigning
the office responsibility to assist agencies in developing their systems.
Although the Hoover Commission had recommended a program to hire and
retain adequate professional accountants, the hearings showed that efforts in
this area and in financial training were minimal and late.
Generalities in the General Accounting Office principles resulted in
raising question of interpretation and led to bargaining and drawn out attempts
to reconcile differences between the agencies and the General Accounting Office,
The Appropriations Committee's insistence on using obligation authority
as the focus point in the appropriations process was also viewed as having a
deterring effect on accounting and budgeting development.
Lack of agency interest and initiative was visible as a major cause of
the poor performance. In many cases, this problem was considerably compli-
cated by the largeness, physical separation, and complex operations of some
Departments.
Above all, the hearings established that the cost of improved accounting
systems was going to be high in terms of increased staffs, training of existing
personnel, contractual costs in developing systems, and establishment of sup-
porting information systems. As compared, the benefits, although real, were
intangible and difficult to measure in cost savings.

CHAPTER IV
CURRENT EMPHASIS AND PROBLEMS IN
DEVELOPING ACCRUAL SYSTEMS
The President's Commission on Budget Concents
The series of Hearings held by the House Committee on Government
Operations on progress being made in developing accounting systems had the
effect of spurring agency improvement efforts; however, another event occurring
during the same period has been of equal significance in its impact on the
move to accrual accounting in the Government.
In March 1967, a high level Commission headed by David M. Kennedy was
appointed by the President to review the Federal budget process. Lyndon B.
Johnson in his chartering letter called particular attention to the confusion
caused by the three existing budgets at that time, and asked that the com-
mission examine the "set of concepts which underlie the major budgetary totals
and their summary presentation." He also suggested a review of "the timing
of disbursements and receipts (for example, cash or accrual)."
The three budgets in use were each stated on a different accounting
basis and differed in the expense and revenue items covered. The Administra-
tive Budget or "President's Budget" highlighted new appropriations being
requested and was stated basically on a checks-issued basis. This budget
Report of the President's Commission on Budget Concepts, David M





excluded the transactions of the Trust Funds. The Consolidated Cash Budget
was used by the Treasury in managing the cash transactions of the Govern-
ment. It was based on checks paid, and while it included the Trust Funds,
other miscellaneous items were missing. The National Income Accounts Budget
had been devised by the economists to interphase with the public sector of
the economy. This budget excluded loans and repayments of loans and was
stated on a combination of accrued expenditures and checks issued. The net
effect of the differences was that the size and impact of government opera-
tions and the estimated deficit or surplus varied considerably, depending
2
on which budget figures were being referred to.
After extensive review, the President's Commission recommended that
the three budgets be replaced by a single "unified' 1 budget. The new budget
would have the advantage of being a single comprehensive document while
still serving, thru the use of bridges and separate tables, the purposes
of the old budgets.
The Commission had to determine the bes^; basis for stating expendi-
tures in the recommended budget. Three primary considerations became the
focus of attention.
First, in viewing the alternative methods of stating the budget, the
Commission became concerned with the fiscal fluctuations and misrepresenta-
tions that occurred in the cash system. In a paper presented by Harvey Galper
at a conference jointly sponsored by the Commission and the Brookings Insti-
tute, it was pointed out that in the last half of 1966 that the true impact







an annual rate. Such fluctuations resulted from the fact that performance
often --recedes disburse:,ents by a considerable period of time.
An inter-agency study group from the General Accounting Office,
Treasury Department, Bureau of the Budget, and the Federal Reserve Board
conducted a brief survey among several agencies to determine the significance
between disbursements and accrued expenditures. The survey measured the
average number of days lag between receipt of goods and services and payment.
No consideration was given to unbilled contractor performance which would
greatly extend the delay discovered or "holdbacks" (i.e., payments earned but
withheld until a contract was satisfactorily completed) which would decrease
the disbursement figure as compared to expenditures for the same period. A
summary of the findings in some of the more prominent agencies follows:
TABLE 2
DELAYS BETWEEN RECEIPT Oh" GOODS AND DISBURSEMENTS








The study group reported to the Commission that the limited survey showed in
most cases that expenditures provided a more prompt and precise measure of








The Commission, after considering this and other information, concluded
The shift toward accrual accounting . . . should make the budget
totals a better index of the impact of Federal financial activities
on the economy and should provide a better reflection of the financial
condition of the government than any of the present concepts.
A second factor considered was the effect of timing on the budget
deficit or surplus and the means of financing a deficit. Since accrued ex-
penditures were considered the most accurate representation of actual govern-
ment operations, it was also felt that this basis would provide the most
meaningful and consistent determination of the deficit or surplus. It was
warned, though, that since accruals preceded disbursements, use of the ex-
penditure figure would generally result in an increased deficit or smaller
surplus figure in periods when government operations were expanding. Al-
though the reverse effect (smaller deficits) would be true when operations
were deflated, expanded operations were the normal circumstance in govern-
ment. The effect on the deficit would initially be heightened because of
the inability to immediately convert all revenues to an accrual basis, a
problem that will later be discussed. The increase to the deficit was
illustrated over a three year period. The deficit would have been increased
by 4.4 billion in 1966, 5.5 billion in 1967 estimated, and 1.2 billion in
1968 estimated. 8
The Commission went on to discuss the importance of the deficit in
terms of financing. It recommended that the budget document should contain a
separate financing section displayed in a prominent place. The statement







should be developed from accrual data. In this presentation, accounts
payable became a way of financing debt. This was because payables repre-
sented bills outstanding for which no cash payment had been made or was
required in the current period. The deficit figure could be reduced by the
value of payables in determining the debt requiring public financing.
The Commission, thirdly, considered the relationship of Government
and business accounting. Businesses had operated under accrual systems for
years. The incompatability resulted in difficulties in analyzing statistics
complied by the Office of Business Economics for both the public and private
sectors of the economy. Businesses reflected inventory allocations and revenues
earned without the government assuming a corresponding liability or inventory
increase. Placing both sides of the National Income accounts on a similar
basis would permit a truer picture of the overall economy. The interlock
would never be perfect because of variances in civilian accounting practices
and the existance of "mail floats'* (i.e., documents in transit recorded by
only one party)
.
In discussing the reasons for their recommendations, the commission
called attention to the financial improvement efforts being made in govern-
ment, particularly in the installation of accrual accounting systems. The
assertion was made that the "accrual concept for budget purposes will foster
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Problems In Converting the Budget to an Acerued Fx nend iture Basis
The Report of the President's Commission presupposed several problems
in adapting the recommendation for an accrued expenditure budget. Conse-
quently, it was suggested that stating the budget on an accrual basis should
be deferred until submission of the Fiscal Year 1971 Budget in January 1970.*"
A major problem recognized was conversion of all agency accounting
systems to the accrual basis. A report submitted by the inter-agency study
group led the Commission to believe that the changeover, with the possible
exception of the Defense Department, could be completed in time for the
Fiscal Year 1971 Budget.
A second problem was seen in delays in reporting accrual data to the
Treasury. Retention of the disbursement reports used for cash management
would be necessary. Initially, it was forseen that accrual reports would take
a longer time in compiling, but by 1970 it was believed that accrual reports
would be available on the same time frame as the cash reports.
The greatest problem; however, was considered to be the development
of an adequate means of accruing revenue. No previous experience had been
gained in measuring and recording the accumulated tax liabilities of the
private sector. Devising a suitable means for accruing Income and Corporation
taxes appeared particularly difficult. Estimating individual tax liability
at other than the end of the year, seemed the more complex problem; however,
economists generally agreed that the individual tax was not as variable or









as important to predicting economic behavior as the corporation tax. ^
Measuring Constructive Delivery
The Commission's identification of the key issues has proven quite
accurate; however, neither the scope or true priority of the problems were
forseen.
The President approved the Commission's recommendations in December
1967. Between April and June 1968, the Office of Management and Budget, the
General Accounting Office, and the Treasury published instructions to collect
data on a trial basis and to prepare for the changeover in 1970.
An Inter-Agency Study Group (0MB, GAO, Treasury) was established to
determine materiality of the amount involved in unbilled contractor per-
formance. The group, after visiting ninety- two Defense plants, concluded
that the amount was significant, but recognized problems in documenting work
performed through multiple tiers of contractors and sub-contractors. An
example of the layering problem is shown by the statistics on subcontractors
derived by the study group from twenty-one plants.
15 Ibid.
, p. 43-5.
16Bureau of the Budget, Bulletin "No. 68-10," Washington, D.C., April
26, 1968, provided implementing instructions to the agencies, Treasury Depart-
ment, "Transmittal Letter No. 18," Washington, D.C., June 20, 1968, contained
instructions on reporting requirements to the Treasury, and Comptroller-
General of the United States, Letter to Heads of Departments and Agencies
"Accounting for Accrued Expenditures and Revenues," Washington, D.C., May 4,
1968, modified accounting principles to recognize monthly reporting require-
ments, the constructive delivery concept, etc..
17Inter-agency Study Group, Report of the Interagency Study Group on
Contractor Reporting for Purposes of Federal Acc ounting and Reporting of

















It was recommended that to begin with, only work documented by invoices
or requests for progress payments be included in accruals, and that an attempt
be made to develop statistical techniques in estimating unbilled performance.
As a result, the Office of Management and Budget published a supplement to
Bulletin 68-10 in which statistical methods previously allowed for smaller
contracts were extended to all contracts. Use of the statistical methods re-
1 Q
quired adequate verfication of accuracy, at least annually.
The Defense Department undertook their own study of constructive delivery
since they were the most involved in the problem. An attempt to directly
1 F
Bureau of the Budget, "Bulletin No. 08-10, Supplement No. 1,"
Washington, D.C., July 1, 1969, pp. 3-5.
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document unbilled contractor performance on a test basis was terminated as
the result of a letter from the National Security Industrial Association (NSIA)
to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. This letter complained that the
constructive delivery concept went, beyond business concepts of accrual account-
ing, and that such data was not a normal consideration for businesses or
necessary for internal control. The letter then cited the derogatory effects
on one Division of a major contractor in the areospace industry. Ten thousand
purchase orders were received by this Division each year and approximately six
to seven thousand were outstanding at any one time. This meant that six to
seven thousand reports would be required monthly. In turn, 70,OU0 orders per
year were placed on subcontractors. The majority of the subcontractors would
not or could not make the necessary monthly reports. A major problem also
existed in allocating work in process among government agencies. Additionally,
the Division operated on a four week accounting period in lieu of the monthly
cycles on which government reports were desired. The costs of supplying the
desired data, even if available, would be exorbitant.^
The criticism leveled in the National Security Industrial Association's
letter led the Defense study group to search for a method of statistically
estimating constructive delivery. After completing a "birth to death" analysis
of fifty-one procurement contracts, a determination was reached that the
statistical model did not "estimate 'unbilled performance' with a sufficiently
high degree of reliability for inclusion in the Defense Department accounting
and budgeting system."
19Letter from National Security Industrial Association to the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, Washington, D.C., December 26, 1968.
70*- uD0D Special Study Group, Report of the Group, Defense Contractor





The Department concurred with these findings and turned the project
over to the Office of Business Economics (ODE) for their use and development
in forecasting the economic impact of Defense activities.
Accounting for Federal Grants
A problem similar to constructive deliver)' was experienced in record-
ing accruals on grants awarded to states and colleges. The majority of
grantees did not keep their accounts on an accrual basis and therefore could
not report the desired data. Carl Tiller, Special Advisor on Budgetary De-
velopment in the Bureau of the Budget, has claimed that resistance from
grantees has been supported by program personnel in Federal Government who
did not want to impose sanctions, and by financial personnel who believed
that processing paperwork under the new system could add as much as 40,000
? 1documents per month to internal workload.
Tax Revenues
Accruing tax revenues has never seriously gotten off the ground.
Another inter-agency study group was formed to develop statistical methods
of determining corporation tax accruals, but then disbanded before testing
began. The Treasury was left to work with the Office of Business Economics.
As of the end of 1970, no satisfactory method had been decided on. The
Treasury also undertook soliciting the views of nineteen experts on the ad-
vantages to accruing individual income tax. Nine reported favoring accrual,
but few offered ideas on how it might be done. A study has been comptemplated,
21 Carl W. Tiller, "Accrual Accounting and Budgeting for the Government,"
The Federal Accountant, XIX (March, 1970), p. 81.
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but has not been performed or undertaken.
The Treasury Reports
Timeliness and reliability of accrual data reported to the Treasury
has also represented a larger problem than anticipated by the Budget Com-
mission. Based on Treasury estimates in 1967, the Commission was led to
believe that accrual reports would be published during the test period six
weeks after the end of a reporting month. This compares to the three weeks
required for publishing cash reports. The Treasury's six week estimate was
based on receiving agency reports on the first working day after the 24th of
the month. Experience gained in the first test year (July 1968 - June 1969)
showed considerable improvement throughout the year; however, by June 1969,
only twenty-eight percent of the reports were being received in the required
23twenty- five day time frame.
TABLE 4
DELAY IN REPORTING ACCRUAL DATA: JUNE 1969
Number of Agencies














It must be remembered in viewing the statistics in Table 4 that in order to
convert to the accrual basis in publishing monthly reports, even the twenty-
five day limit must be drastically reduced. Serious questions have also
24been raised as to the accuracy of the data being received.
Current Status of Accounting; Systems
1969 Comptroller-General's Report
A more basic problem in developing the capability for the 1971 Budget
was reflected in the 1969 report published by the Comptroller-General on
progress being made to improve accounting systems. As mentioned in Chapter III,
the General Accounting Office score card as of December 31, 1968, showed only
62 of 148 Civil Department accounting systems approved. (See Appendix I) The
report pointed to progress though in that ten systems, an all time high, re-
ceived formal acceptance in 1968. Also, thirty-two agencies had attained
25
approval of principles upon which systems were to be developed and operated.
This was the step added to the General Accounting Office approval procedures
in 1967.
The General Accounting Office indicated deficiencies still existed in
the areas of the application of the accrual concept in practice, implementing
and operating property accounting systems, coordinating the efforts of Account-
ing and Planning, Programming and Budgeting staffs, developing good cost
accounting systems, and hiring of qualified accountants.
24
L.D. Mosso, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Accounts, Treasury Depart-
ment, private interview held at the Treasury Department Annex, Washington, D.C.,
December, 1970.
°U.S. Congress, House, Progress an d Problems Relating to Improvement of
Federal Agency Accounting Sys tc-is a s of De cember 51, 1'JoS, B ll.r>.VJS, Report of
the Cowp t foiier-Generai ot tlie United States, 91st Cong. , 1st scssT, 1909, p . 6
.
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In a letter appended to the report dated October, 1969, Comptroller-
General Staats announced that General Accounting Office had eliminated formal
approval of systems in operation. According to him the change was
. . .
intended to provide a more effective method of operation and to
result in our making more evaluations of the operation of agency
accounting systems and proposing constructive recommendations for
strengthening or otherwise improving those systems.
Another reason for this change is that accounting systems for
Federal agency operations are seldom static since they must keep
abreast of changes in information system concepts, technology, and
changes in Federal program operations. To attempt to keep the
"approved" status of all systems on a current basis can be an
impossible objective. [Underline mine]
Staats continued on to say that the General Accounting Office felt they
could accomplish as much or more by cooperating with the agencies and by making
27
reviews of systems in operations and preparing written reports.
In order tc fully evaluate the effect of this change in approval proce-
dures, it is necessary to reflect on the change in the General Accounting
Office emphasis between 1965 and 1968 and to examine the evolution of account-
ing principles from their first publication in 1952. In 1965, the original
principles were republished in an attempt
1. To consolidate into one comprehensive statement pronouncements
that over the years have been made in different documents.
2. To clarify the statement of our principles where needed, based
on experience.
3. To make our stated principles and standards more specific where
believed needed, based on experience.
4. To incorporate statements of principle on matters not previously
covered.
5. To revamp the organization of the statement to produce a more
cohesive document. 28
27 Ibid
., pp. VI and VII.
28
"Transmittal Sheet No. 2-18," The Comptroller-General of the United
States, Accounting Principles and Standards for Federal Agencies , Washington,
D.C., (With 1968 Revisions), 19oo.

79
Review of the new procedures reflect that the wording was indeed made
more concise and firm, "Each executive agency's accounting system must conform
in all material respects, to the principles, standards, an;.' related requirements
for accounting prescribed by the Comptroller-General." Although deviations were
permitted, the agency was squarely charged with the responsibility to justify
7 9
any deviation."
The more concise and forceful wording of principles was followed by the
addition of the third step requirement to submit agency principles for approvals
The series of changes in principles and approval procedures indicate the
General Accounting Office's recognition that the principles had to be made more
specific, and provide the basis for initial agreement from which agencies could
develop and implement their systems. Cy the same token, the General Accounting
Office had finally realized the futility of attempting to inspect and attach
a seal of approval to systems in operations.
1970 Comptroller-General Report
The 1970 report of the Comptroller-General was the first issued under
the new two step approval procedure. The approval statistics counted pre-
viously approved systems as approvals of principles and systems design. On
this basis, in the Civil Departments, 65 of 155 system designs and 95 of 122
principles were approved. The Department of Defense reflected twenty-three
segments of principles and six systems designs approved. This data is diffi-
cult to interpret since its basis is not compatible with past statistics;
29 lb id
., pp. 2-14.
° The Comptroller-General of the United States, Status, Progress and




however, some inroads were apparently made, since during 1969 alone, twenty-
one statements of principles and eight systems designs were approved in civil
departments, and eight statements and three designs in the Defense.
The analysis of agency developments was compiled entirely from agency
reports and the answers to questionnaires formulated by the General Accounting
Office. Indicative of the improvement still required, less than half of the
agencies were found to be using cost data in day to day operations, even
though the majority were preparing monthly statements of operating costs.
Property control was still found inadequate. "*
The problem of hiring and retaining qualified accountants reported in the
1969 Report had partially alleviated itself, but still existed. Training
efforts were on the upswing. The Financial Management and Planning, Programming
and Budgeting Training Center initiated by the Civil Service Commission in 1967
had trained some 2,167 personnel in eight-five sessions of nineteen training
33programs. Regional Commission offices had trained an additional 2,200 people.
Responses to a GAO inquiry of whether accrual accounting had been
implemented in accordance with established policy indicated, that ninety-five
Departments had installed such systems and thirty-six had not fully implemented
them or felt that accrual accounting was not applicable. Included among those
who had not fully implemented systems were the Department of Agriculture (six
systems), the Department of Commerce (two systems), IILW (eight systems), De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (seven systems), the Department of










Department of State (tv.o systems), the Department of Transportation (one
system), and Independent Agencies (five systems). The fact that some of
the major civilian agencies and the Department of Defense had not fully
implemented accrual accounting reflects how much remained to be done before
the goals established by the 1950 Budget and Accounting Act, as amended, and
the President's Commission on Budget Concepts were met.
An interesting sidelight in the report is the revelation that the
Labor Department's target dates for submitting systems had slipped as the
result of
. . .
the need to accustom fiscal personnel to new systems techniques,
and the inability of consultants obtained to assist in the accounting
systems development effort to retain personnel initially assigned on
the job until completion of the contract. 00
This is the Department that had been invited by Congress in 1968 to display
the system being developed with the assistance of million dollar contracts.
Other Problems
Costs of Improvement
The hearings conducted by the House Committee on Government Operations
had revealed explicit costs in developing systems as the result of increased
personnel requirements, and the need to hire consultants to assist in the
initial design, implementation and training phases. The later costs varied
from as small as $5,000 in Interior up to the million plus Labor Department
Contract. In addition to these two agencies contracts had been used by HEW
and the Department of Agriculture. The use of consultants continued to be
common throughout 1969. As an example, the Navy let a 1969 contract with
34
Ibid
. , pp. 26-27.
35 Ibid.
, pp. 81-2.





Haskins and Sells to study their accounting organization and procedures. The
37
initial cost was 5400,000.
Larry Jobe, Administrative Secretary in the Commerce Department, further
illustrated the costliness of the efforts at improved financial management when
he pointed out that between 1964 and 1969, the number of financial management
people in Government increased from 121,000 to a 162,000. This was an increase
of 34% as compared with an overall increase in Government employment of 18%
for the same period. He also called attention to increased computer expenses,
(capital and operating) from $463 million in 1960 to 2.2 billion in 1970.
Jobe implied that computer use for financial management had increased at least
38proportionate to the increase in overall costs.
Obligation Emphasis of the House Appropriations Committee
The House Appropriations Committee has continued to be unwilling to
accept the accrued expenditure concept. Mr. Andrews, in reporting the 1970
legislative Branch Appropriation Bill out of committee, leveled an assault
on the accrual concept which included the following points:
1. The 1956 Budget and Accounting Act ordained accrual accounting,
not accrual budgeting.
2. There has been less than enthusiastic support for accrual account-
ing among agencies.
3. The General Accounting Office has diverted two hundred man years
37Rear Admiral V.A. Lascara, Assistant Comptroller, Financial Management
Service, Department of Navy, Lecture given at the George Washington University,
November 9,' 1970
3R
°Larry A. Jobe, "Financial Management in the Federal Government 'Are
We Doing Less With More?" 1 Manuscript of address delivered at the 19th Annual




from pressing audit needs to assist agencies in accounting systems
development.
4. In many agencies expenditures and cash outlays are almost
synonymous
.
5. Accrual requirements are superimposed on cash obligation records.
6. Many managers will continue to operate on an obligation basis.
7. Obligations are the steps that set the wheels of production in
motion.
8. Congress went out of its way to keep from requiring use of
accrual budgets in 1956.
9. It is difficult to conclude that accrued expenditure data
would be as reliable as cash data.
10. More time and effort will be required in obtaining expenditure
data.
11. "Expenditures" is not an easily understood concept.
39
12. Auditing would become more difficult under the accrual system.
The controversy heated up again on the House floor when Mr. Monagan
and Mr. Holifield, both members of the Committee on Government Operation,
challenged the validity of Mr. Andrews' remarks and the jurisdiction of the
Appropriations Committee in surveying the form of agency accounting systems.
Mr. Mahon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, used the opportunity to
40
get excerpts of the committee report in the Congressional Record.
39
U.S. Congress, House, Legislative Branch Appropriation Bill, 1970,
H.R. 91-487, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 25-55.
40
U.S. Congress, House, Representative Monagon, Holifield, and Mahon
speaking on the Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, 1970, H.R. 91-487,




Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
Other blows have recently been struck. The Clue Ribbon Defense Panel
included a recommendation in their Report that:
Accrual Accounting systems in the Department of Defense should
be confined to those service activities which operate under stock
or industrial funds, and which are required to establish service
charges which reflect total costs.
^
1
The only reason given for the Blue Ribbon Recommendation was that accrual data
was more costly and provided little benefit to non-profit organizations. The
source of the recommendation has been attributed to Wilfred J. McNeil who was
4°
the Department of Defense Comptroller in the late 1950' s.
Also of interest, the recommendation drew partial support from Howard
Wright, current Chairman of the Division of Accounting, Department of Business
Administration at Maryland University, and past editor of the Federal Accountant ,
In a letter written to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Wright pointed out
that he endorsed neither the limitation recommended by the Panel or the total
commitment to accrual accounting expressed by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants in an earlier magazine article. He felt that
each case had to be considered on an individual basis. Predominantly consuming
units could operate efficiently using obligations. Other areas (e.g., procure-
ment, stock funds, etc.) required accrual systems. Wright ended by stating that
^ Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel to l:.e President an.l the
Secretary of bofvr.se of the Dep artment of Defen ce, Gilbert W. Fitzhugh,
chairman ('..ashin^ton, D.C.: Government Printing office, 1970), p. 128.
John Cooley, Director, Office of Accounting Policy, Department of De-
fense, private interview held at the Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.,
December, 1970.
4oThe views of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
are contained in "AICPA Opposes Part of Defense Panel Suggestions," Journal
of Accounting, October, 1970, pp. 11-12.

systems should be no more complex than the control and information needs of
44
the Department.
The recommendation has since been rejected in substance, but not before
the Air Force and Marine Corps had expressed general agreement. °
Delay of Acc rued Expenditure Budget
All of these problems have pointed to an inability to meet the Fiscal
Year 1971 conversion deadline. In March 1969, President Nixon lent his
personal support to the move toward accrual accounting. One month later,
the Treasury, Bureau of the Budget, and Council of Economic Advisors announced
A *7
that conversion of the budget was being delayed until Fiscal Year 1972.
In September 1970 the Office of Management and Budget announced another delay
48
until Fiscal Year 1973.
Ellsworth 11. Morse, Jr., Director, Office of Policy and Special Studies,
General Accounting Office, has made one of the more curious statements con-
cerning the delay. In an address to the 10th Annual Eastern Regional Confer-
ence of the Planning Executives Institute, More,e described the action of the
President's Commission on Budget Concepts in recommending an accrued expendi-
ture budget as taking
Letter from Howard W. Wright to the Secretary of Defense, College
Park, Maryland, October 12, 1970.
Brigadier General 11. L. Beckington, memorandum to Chief of Staff
United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., October 8, 1970.
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Richard Nixon, Memorandum to The Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
The Secretary of the Treasury, The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors,
Washington, D.C. , February 22, 1969.
Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the Bureau of
the Budget, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and Comptroller-Gen-
eral of the United States to Heads of Departments and Agencies, Washington,
D.C, March 10, 1970.
4 8 Letter from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to
Departments and Agencies, Washington, D.C, September 15, 1970.
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... a somewhat rosy view of the capacity of Federal agency account-
ing systems to produce reliable data on the accrual basis . . .
In retrospect, this suggestion was highly unrealistic and the
issue even today -- three years later -- is still in doubt. The
issue is simply one of whether, under the present state of the art
of accounting data handling methods, and capabilities, it will
ever be possible for all Federal Agencies, ... to not only develop
their budgets on the accrual basis, but to accumulate, prepare, and
deliver tinely reports ... on that basis. . . . J' y
Tae statement shows a more skeptical outlook than was expressed when
a report bearing Morse's name was submitted to the President's Commission in
1967. At that time the observation was made "Under present circumstances
it may be two years or more before all major agencies will be in a position
to report the necessary data promptly each month." hTo mention was made as
to the possibility of not being able to provide the data. In fact, the
proposed expenditure budget was seen as speeding up accounting procedural
changes in the agencies. ^ It was this statement, that was drawn on liberally
by the Commission in concluding that the accounting changeover could be
accomplished in two years.
Summary
The President's Commission on Budget Concepts recommended that the
unified budget be stated on accrued expenditures. The accrued concept was
considered to provide the most reliable data on the true size and impact of
Government expenditures, the interphase between the Public and Private sectors
of the economy, and the size of the national debt and means of financing it.
The major prerequisites to carrying out the Commission's recommendations
Ellsworth i!. Morse, "The Report of the President's Commission on
Budget Concepts in Retrospect ," manuscript of address presented at the 10th
Annual, liastern Regional Conference of the Planning Executive Institute,
Washington, D.C., October 16, 1970.
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were the conversion of all government accounting systems to an accrual basis
the establishment of a capability to collect timely accrual reports at the
Treasury', and the accrual of corporate and individual income tax.
These prerequisites have not been satisfied and resultingly the
deadline for the accrued expenditure budget lias been twice pushed back,
currently to 1973. There is considerable doubt that even this deadline will
be met.
The problems remaining to be solved with accounting systems are of
long standing and some such as the handling of grants and constructive
deliver)' are just beginning to be reasonably examined. Attempts to collect
data in these areas have led to the use of statistical estimates and the
Bureau of the Budget's directives have recognized the compromise measures
needed.
The General Accounting Office has finally recognized the impossibility
of attempting to inspect and approve systems in operation. The emerging role
of the General Accounting Office is to promulgate principles that provide a
firm direction and put the burden on the agency to justify deviations to secure
agreement as to the agency concepts (i.e., principles) on which their systems
are to be built, to assist agencies in developing systems, to approve systems
designs, and to make periodic on site inspections and reports on systems in
operations.
The Civil Service Commission has taken steps to expand financial train-
ing; however, critical problems still remain at Agency level hiring qualified
personnel.
The House Appropriations Committee has continued to resist consideration
of budgets stated on any basis other than new obligation authority requested.
Finally, the high cost of installing and operating accrual systems has
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been repeatedly demons t rated. The question that renains unanswered is whether




Fifteen years after making accrual accounting a legislative requirement
for ail Federal agencies, and even more years since some managers, the central
financial agencies, the lioover Commissions, and other autiioritative groups,
and individuals recognized the need for better accounting, accrual systems and
procedures have not been uniformly or satisfactorily adopted to all agencies.
The question that begs answering is, why has progress been so slow?
This paper lias pointed to many possible answers to that question; how-
ever, there is no single or simple solution. The Droblems that have been in-
volved are interrelated in many respects. Certainly it is impossible to
accurately measure and assign reliable causative indexes. Nonetheless, one
basic problem has shown itself time and again as a root cause of the unsatis-
factory results. That problem is the failure to provide a single source of
leadership and coordination to the drive for accrual systems. The General
Accounting Office was given and has exercised the responsibility for prescrib-
ing principles and assisting agencies in developing accounting systems. Execu-
tive involvement has been reluctant, belated, and insufficient. The fallacy
in the arrangement that has existed is four fold.
First, the General Accounting Office is not a part of the management/
executive chain. As such, they are not privy or involved in day to day manage-
ment problems and decisions. Tiiose problems they do encounter are bound to be




Secondly, being outside tne management chain, the General Account-
in;, Office is placed in the position of not being able to direct agency
action or to take corrective action where necessary. The General Account-
ing Office has been able to stir sonic action through its role of report-
ing inactivity and deficiencies in systems to Congress; however, this
coercive method is an ineffective substitute for dealing with the com-
plex problems that have arisen over the years. Significantly, the General
Accounting Office nas recognized tneir inability to command action. Be-
ginning in l lJo5, their method of operation has changed, first, by pro-
viding large scale assistance to the agencies, then by securing agreement
on principles on which systems were to be based and finally, by eliminating
the "systems in operation" approval that had become the focus of attention
for the Hearings held by the House Committee on Government Operations.
Thirdly, by virtue of GAO's role as the inspection (i.e., audit)
are of Congress, they are not in a position to elicit cooperation and
openness from the agencies.
Fourthly, accounting is an adjunct of budgeting. That the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1950 could talk about performance budget based on
unit costs, without first considering the capabilities of the prevail-
ing accounting systems to produce such data reflects ignorance as to the
proper relation of accounting and budgeting. Budgeting relies on data
provided by the accounting system to evaluate how well plans are being
executed and in providing the base from which future budget estimates are
formulated. The people who should be most concerned with good account-




The existing accounting structure was criticized prior the Hoover Com-
missions. The first Hoover Commission then re cornier, ded the establishment of
a separate Accountant General in the Treasury. In each case, the recommenda-
tion was seen as a challenge to Congressional power, and rejected primarily on
that basis.
At the time of the First Hoover Commission, the Joint Financial Manage-
ment Improvement Program was held forth as the institution that would provide
the necessary leadership. While the program has served to coordinate solution
of some mutual problems and as a center for publicizing reports of agency
efforts, it has not served the role claimed for it in 1950.
The proper accounting structure would have given full responsibility to
the Bureau of the Budget for prescribing accounting principles, assisting agen-
cies, and if determined necessary, approving systems. The General Accounting
Office would have then served as the auditor, reporting accounting shortcomings
to the Bureau and Congress. While it is conjecture that such an arrangement
would have produced better results, there can be no doubt that at least responsi-
bility for the inadequate performance could be placed. This is not true under
the present set up even though the Budget and Accounting Act of 1956 made the
head of each agency responsible for adequate systems. "Each agency" is a rather
vague, indefinite term when attempting to attach overall responsibility.
Congress must assume an equitable share of the blame for the accrued
accounting failure. As already mentioned, the Congress repeatedly guarded
against what they considered an "attack" on the General Accounting Office and
rejected all proposals for basic structural changes.
Within Congress, the House Appropriations Committee has been a major
deterrent to progress. Their constant emphasis on obligations in the budget
process has had the natural effect of creating a preoccupation among agencies
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with that concept. It is easy to say that both accrual and obligation account-
ing have their place, but as long as operating funds are requested and justi-
fied almost exclusively on an obligation basis, it is that concept that will
have prominence, and be of the most concern to the manager.
Hie evidence also tends to indict the house Committee on Government
Operations. Their interest in better accouting systems was commendable and
stirred some long overdue action on the part of agencies. However, at tines
their emphasis seemed more with surface indicators (e.g., approval statistics)
of progress than with the substantive problems involved. It is felt that this
stress on figures led to many superficial efforts in submitting incomplete
systems to beat the numbers game, and to comply with Congressional desires.
The 11)67 hearing particularly evidenced this in the cases of the Departments
of Interior and Agriculture.
Alnost unbelievably, considering the Committee's prominent role in
conducting hearings on the 1950 and 1956 accounting legislation, no one on the
Committee questioned the basic accounting structure as a cause of the failure.
Between 1364 and 1968, the Committee heard evidence of inadequate training and
personnel hiring policies, the lack of leadership provided hy the Bureau of
the Budget or any Executive organization, the failure of the Joint Financial
Management Improvement Program, and the generally dismal record of accounting
improvement. All of these things had been predicted by the First and Second
Hoover Commissions, unless the accounting structure was changed. The Committee
acknowledged that the events had occurred, but never reached or even considered
the logical conclusion.
Certainly, the agencies have not been blameless. Their late appearance
in this analysis is only because the author feels that if the correct accounting
structure had been assumed that the foot dragging and lack of interest would
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have been minimized. The facts; however, point to monumental disinterest ; rid
resistance on the part of agencies. Part of this resulted from the fact that
"obligations" was a more familiar and understandable concept, part fro:-, doubt
that cost benefits would offset the installation costs of new systems, and part
from a lack of qualified personnel to perform the job.
The slowness of the agencies cannot be entirely attributed to manage-
ment inattention and ineptness though. Even today when interest in accrual
accounting is probably at a peak, the problems being encountered are of such a
complex nature that attaching time limits to their solution has proven useless.
Repeatedly, time limits have been set, only to be pushed back. Doth the oper-
ating departments and the Central Agencies have been guilty of understating the
scope of the problems and the amount of effort required to solve them. The re-
sult has been frustration and harassing efforts to fix blame.
The size, diversity, and geographical separation of agencies like the
Departments of Defense, HEW, State, and Labor defy the identification and ready
solution of problems. In many cases the problem is not so much with the De-
partment as with civilian institutions receiving government benefits. The grant
problem is typical. As willing as HEN might be, accruals cannot occur except
on a statistical basis, unless thousands of universities, state governments,
etc., have the capability and are willing to report the necessary data.
The same is true of accruals of "constructive delivery" in the Depart-
ment of Defense. Here the problem is one of getting reports through tiers of
contractors and subcontractors.
The agency also can't be held responsible for the time consuming system
changes required and the confusion caused by introduction of the Planning, Pro-
gramming, and Budgeting Systems, the rise to prominence of the accrued expendi-
ture concept recommended by the President's Commission on Budget Concept, or
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the creation of a third step in the General Accounting Office approval proce-
dures.
The General Accounting Office has contributed to the slowness of agencies
to taking positive action. Early accounting principles and procedures were
vague to the point that agencies could readily get the idea that there was no
push and that most of the accrual accounting procedures were optional. The
generalities involved also contributed to misunderstandings between the General
Accounting Office and the agencies which resulted in wasted effort and an
atmosphere where points were argued.
The largest area of the General Accounting Office fault however, lay
with the systems approval procedure that bottled up systems in a cumbersome re-
view process requiring from one to three years, only for the agency to have to
start afresh, if the system was not approved. The final and most impracticable
step of reviewing systems in operation was eliminated by the 1968 changes to the
General Accounting Office procedures, but not before doing its share to bog
down accounting development.
As to the question of whether or not accrual accounting lias a place in
government operations, the answer is definitely yes. In spite of the absence
in most government agencies of a profit motive or the requirement to match
costs against revenue, there is still a need for good planning and the reliable
measurement of how well plans are being performed." Only accrual accounting pro-
vides such a consistent measure for an agency involved in activities in which
the incurrence of obligations, expenditures, disbursements, and costs is
materially separated in time. In other activities there may well be no need
for accrual data or only for modified data. As an example, an activity using
primarily personnel services and consumable supplies that are issued and used
simultaneously, benefits little from accrual accounting. Lven in an activity
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where costs are incurred in periods significantly beyond the creation of the
obligation or in advance of the disbursement, use of the full accrual concept
may not be desirable or practicable. The expense of contractors reporting
unbilled performance appears excessive to any possible benefits to be gained.
In determining the extent to which accrual accounting is to be applied,
all parties involved might do well to refresh their basic accounting by read-
ing Robert X. Anthony who states, "Accounting is a system for recording and
summarizing measurements of business facts, and as is the case with any measure-
ment, an accounting figure is an approximation rather than a precisely accurate
statement."*
The need for how precise the figure must then be should depend on the
purpose to which the accounting figure is to serve and the cost and time in-
volved in collecting it.
Only if each case is considered on its own merit, and compromises are
developed where needed, will the accrual dilemma ever be solved.
Robert N. Anthony, Management Accounting, Text and Cases (Ilomcwood,
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Data is excerpted from the 1964 and 1966 Hearings of the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations on "Submission of Agency Accounting Systems
for Approval", the 196 7 Hearing on "Rate of Progress Being Made by Govern-
ment Agencies in Meeting the Requirements of the Budget an 1 Accounting Pro-
cedures Act of 1950" and the 1969 P.eport of the Comptroller General to Con-
gress on "Progress and Problems Relating to Improvement of Federal Account-
ing Systems as of December 31, 196G."
9
IIUD came into existence November (J, 1965.
^This Department was created in November, 1966.
The printed statistics on total systems subject to approval reflect
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